Legal Terms - conditional admissibility
the admissibility of evidence whose significance depends on the presence of an unproven hypothesis. The courts allow the admission of such evidence conditionally, pending the demonstration of that fact at a later phase of the litigation. It is sometimes stated that such evidence was received *de bene esse.
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Legal Terms - Condition
n. 1. A major term of a contract. It is sometimes characterised as a term that forms the basis of a contract or is fundamental to it; it is distinguished from a warranty, which is a minor term. While a breach of warranty can only be addressed by a damages action, subject to any contrary clause in a contract, a breach of condition is considered a fundamental break of the contract and gives the aggrieved party the right to treat it as discharged.A warranty or a condition could have a *implied term or a *express term. The courts do not consider the fact that an express provision is labeled as a condition or a warranty just because it is included in the contract (L Schuler AG v Wickman Machine Tools Sales Ltd [1974] AC 235 (HL)). 2. A clause that does not constitute a part of the contract but instead serves as a means of either ending the agreement under specific conditions (a condition subsequent) or suspending it until a predetermined event has occurred (a condition antecedent). This is a prior condition, whereby X agrees to purchase Y's car if it passes its MOT test. A condition in a condition of a contract for the sale of goods is the buyer's right to return the products if they are not satisfied. Legal Terms - concurrent sentence
When an accused person is found guilty of multiple crimes, they may be sentenced to serve one or more sentences concurrently. Typically, concurrent sentences consist of jail periods, meaning that the accused actually serves the entirety of the longest sentence. As an alternative, the court may impose successive sentences that build upon one another. Legal Terms - concurrent planning (twin-track planning)
the preparation required to match qualified foster and adoptive parents with specific children in local government care. First, the strategy calls for the caregivers to make a good effort to get the child back to his or her parents. The caregivers will continue to care for the child and file for adoption if it is clear that this will not happen in a timely manner. The objective Concurrent planning aims to minimize the amount of movements a child in care must endure. "Dual planning" was defined as the circumstance in which a local authority seeks a *placement order (preliminary to adoption) despite realizing that a suitable adoptive placement may not be found and that long-term foster care is the more likely outcome for the child in Re P (Placement Orders: Parental Consent) [2008] EWCA Civ 535. This practice was approved by the Court of Appeal. Legal Terms - concurrent lease
a lease that a landlord grants to run concurrently with another lease for the same space. As a result, the lessee of the concurrent lease takes on all of the other lessee's obligations and rights. Land Law - Passing The Benefit of Convenants in Law Between Successors in Title.
Having examined the transfer of responsibility under common law, we must now determine whether the legal transfer of either a favorable or limiting agreement has occurred. This situation occurs when the initial party that made the agreement sells or transfers their land, which includes the advantages of the original agreement. There are several methods to accomplish this: Through the specific assignment authorized by section 36 of the Law of Property Act 1925. The original covenantee must assign the benefit of the covenant simultaneously with the transfer of the land to the successor in title, as mandated by the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. If the third party is explicitly named, they will have the same advantage under section 56 of the Law of Property Act 1925. If the third party was identified at the time the covenant was established, then that individual is eligible to receive benefits from the covenant. For the benefit of the covenant to run in law several conditions must be met: the covenant must ‘touch and concern’ the land, the original covenantee must have held legal estate in the benefited land,the successor in title must obtain their title from or under the original covenantee, and the benefit of the covenant must have been intended to run with the land. There are three methods to prove this: - by explicit annexation - through implicit annexation - through section 78 of the Law of Property Act 1925. The covenant must ‘touch and concern’ the land The benefit of a covenant will pass to a successor in title, provided the covenant is beneficial to the land itself and not simply a benefit to the original covenantee personally. A good tip is to look at whether the covenant affects the way in which the land can be used or its value. At the date of the covenant, the original covenantee held a legal estate in the benefited land So, the covenantee must hold one of the recognised legal estates in land. The benefit of a covenant would not pass if the original covenantee only held an equitable interest in the land. The successor in title must obtain their title from or under the original covenantee Pre-1925 covenants required that the successor in title held the same legal estate as the original covenantee, so if the original legal estate was freehold then the successor in title must also hold a freehold estate in the land. However, post-1925 covenants do not have the same requirement, so where the original covenantee held a freehold estate but then later grants a leasehold estate, the covenant can still be enforced by that successor in title. The benefit of the covenant was intended to run with the land This is where you may hear the term ‘annexed’ or ‘annexation’, which can be separated into the three categories set out below: by express annexation by implied annexation by s 78 LPA 1925 Key term: annexation Annexation means the permanent attachment of a covenant to the benefited land, in such a way that the benefit of the covenant will pass on any transfer of the land. by express annexation This is where some form of words of annexation are used in the deed, expressly stating that the covenant will benefit a specific piece of land, and that it is intended to pass to successive owners of the land. In these circumstances, the benefit of the covenant will pass automatically with the land to future owners. by implied annexation The Court may be prepared to imply that the benefit of the covenant will pass to successors in title if the facts of the case show the identity of the land being benefited is sufficiently clear. However, these are used very rarely due to the availability of both express annexation and statutory provisions of s 78 LPA 25. Statutory Annexation under Section 78 LPA 1925 It means that every covenant which is held to touch and concern the land will automatically be annexed to the land in question, with the benefit of that covenant automatically passing to successors in title in equity. This has in some way resolved the issues of express and implied annexation. Dina owns two adjoining properties, numbers 2 and 4 Beswick Close. Dina sells number 4 to Ken so Dina is the original covenantee under the conveyance and Ken is the original covenantor. Within the conveyance there is a covenant stating, ‘with and for the benefit of Dina and his successors in title and the owners of number 2 Beswick Close, not to use number 4 Beswick Close for occupation by more than one family at a time’. Dina sells his property to Marie. Kenny then starts construction work to convert number 4 Beswick Close into a house of multiple occupation to let out to students. Can Marion enforce this covenant against Ken? Yes, she can. Firstly, she can prove that the covenant ‘touches and concerns’ the land as covenants of this type have been held to satisfy this condition. Dean held legal title at the time the covenant was made and so the second condition is met. Marion’s title can easily be traced back to the original conveyance made between Dina and Kenny. Finally, it is also intended, by the wording of the deed, that the benefit of this covenant would pass to successors in title. Passing The Burdern OF Covneants In Law Between Successors in Title
It is crucial to notice that these rules cannot be mixed. In other words, if the responsibility of a legal agreement is transferred, it will only be enforceable if the advantage of the agreement has also been transferred in a legal manner. According to common law, any covenant, whether it be a positive or negative obligation, is not capable of being transferred to subsequent owners of the land. The initial covenant prohibiting the keeping of pet birds on the property is still valid in the deed. However, since Tom is a new owner and was not originally involved in the deed, Linda cannot legally sue him based on basic contractual principles if Tom chooses to maintain pet birds on the land at a later time. In order for Linda to enforce the covenant against Tom, she must provide evidence that the burden of the covenant has been transferred to him. In other words, we need to determine if the burden has been legally associated with the land. Linda retains her status as the original party to the deed, so maintaining the entitlement to the covenant's benefits. If you encounter a query regarding the sale of land that is bound by a covenant, it may be beneficial to create a concise diagram illustrating the different parcels of land. Tom is not bound by any legal agreements under common law. However, we must determine if any obligations have been established under equity law. There is a single exception to this rule that you may need to be aware of. The principle of reciprocal burden and benefit: If a landowner experiences specific advantages on their land, they can only obtain such advantages if they also accept the associated responsibilities. An instance of this could occur when an individual has the advantage of utilizing common hallways in a shared structure, but they fail to maintain their portion of those corridors in a satisfactory condition or keep them tidy. Manchester Diocesan Council for Education v Commercial and General Investments Ltd (1969) Ch7/22/2024 Manchester Diocesan Council for Education v Commercial and General Investments Ltd (1969) Ch
The plaintiff wanted to sell a school that was scheduled to close in August 1967. The complainant requested tenders in 1964 and requested them to be received by August 27, 1964. The fourth requirement for the tender sale was: The person whose tender is accepted shall be the purchaser and shall be informed of the acceptance of his tender by letter sent to him by post addressed to the address given in his tender. The defendant made a tender in a letter that included the words: ...we agree that in the event of this offer being accepted in accordance with the above conditions...we will...complete the purchase in accordance with the said conditions. The defendant made the highest tender and, during September 1964, there was some correspondence between the plaintiff’s surveyor and the defendant’s surveyor. On 15 September, the plaintiff’s surveyor wrote to the defendant’s surveyor: The sale has now been approved by the Manchester Diocesan Council for Education...[The] diocesan registrar...has been instructed to obtain the approval of the Secretary of State for Education. As soon as this is given he will be getting in touch with...your client’s solicitors. The approval of the Secretary of State was obtained on 18 November. On 23 December, the plaintiff’s solicitors wrote to the defendant’s solicitors to confirm the contract. On 5 January, the defendant’s solicitors replied that they could ‘not confirm that there is a binding contract in this matter’. On 7 January 1965, the plaintiff’s solicitors wrote to the defendant at the address given in the tender form and accepted the offer. Held there was a contract. (I) The letter of 15 September 1964 was an acceptance even though it appeared not to comply with condition 4. Buckley J had two reasons for this decision, (i) A request by the defendant offeror for a certain method of acceptance would normally be construed as a request for that method or another which was as good. Per Buckley J: ‘If an offeror intends that he shall be bound only if his offer is accepted in some particular manner, it must be for him to make this clear ’ (ii) Condition 4 was introduced into the bargain by the plaintiff: ‘It would consequently be a term strict compliance with which the plaintiff could waive, provided the defendant was not adversely affected.’ (II) (1.3.2) In any case, the letter of 7 January 1965 was a valid acceptance in accordance with condition 4. The rule that an offer lapses if not accepted within a reasonable time is based on ‘thequestion...whether the offeree should be held to have refused the offer by his conduct’. Following the letter of 15 September 1964, it was clear that plaintiff had not refused the offer, so acceptance was still possible on 7 January. In Re London and Northern Bank ex p Jones (1899)
The applicant applied for 1,000 shares of the corporation on October 15, 1898. He retracted his application by registered mail on October 26. On October 27, the withdrawal arrived around 8.30 am, and the company secretary opened it at 9.30 am. Meanwhile, on October 26, the company's board decided to provide the applicant the shares and accepted his offer in writing. On October 27, at around seven in the morning, the allocation letters were gathered during the night and taken out to be mailed. The letter was given to a postman on a London street at roughly 7.30 am. The letter was sent at 11:00 a.m., based on the postmark. Holding that the applicant withdrew his offer around 8.30 or 9.30 am, the company was unable to demonstrate that the acceptance of his offer had been posted beforehand. According to Cozens-Hardy J: The Postal Guide...expressly states that town postmen are not allowed to take charge of letters for the post... I cannot, therefore, regard the postman as anything better than a boy messenger employed by [the company] to post the letters and the mere fact of handing the letter to the postman...was not a posting of the letter. Henthorn v Fraser (1892) CA
On July 7, 1891, the plaintiff—who was illiterate—was at the defendants' Liverpool office when they presented him with an offer to buy a number of dwellings. The letter was brought home to Birkenhead by the plaintiff. The defendants retracted their offer via postal mail to the plaintiff on July 8th, between 12:00 and 1:00 pm. The plaintiff's attorney posted the plaintiff's acceptance of the offer at 3:50 p.m. At 5:30 p.m., the defendants withdrew, and at 8:30 p.m., the plaintiff accepted. Despite the fact that the offer was not made by post, it was held that there existed a contract because acceptance had already been finalized at the time of posting. The notion that the postal rule was predicated on an offeror-to-offeree implicit consent to treat the post office as the offeror's agent was rejected by both Lord Herschell and Kay LJ. According to Lord Herschell: I should prefer to state the rule thus: where the circumstances are such that it must have been within the contemplation of the parties that, according to the ordinary usages of mankind, the post might be used as a means of communicating the acceptance of an offer, the acceptance is complete as soon as it is posted. |
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