​KembaraXtra- Case Law-Michael (1840)-Causation in Criminal Law
​This case is a foundational example in understanding causation in criminal law, specifically how a defendant can be held liable for a prohibited result even when the immediate cause of that result is an intervening act.

Case: Michael (1840)Key Legal Concept: Causation
Facts:

• The defendant (D) provided a large, lethal dose of laudanum (an opiate) to his child's nurse.
• D falsely represented the laudanum as medicine intended for the child.
• The nurse, for reasons not specified but crucially not administered by her, left the laudanum on her mantelpiece.
• The nurse's five-year-old child then independently accessed and administered the laudanum to D's child.
• D's child died as a direct result of ingesting the laudanum.

Legal Issue:Could the defendant be held criminally liable for the child's death, specifically for murder, given that the immediate administration of the fatal dose was carried out by an innocent third party (the nurse's child)?

Holding:The defendant (D) was found guilty of murder.

Reasoning and Key Takeaways for Study:

1. Causation Established: The court determined that D caused the child's death. This is the central takeaway.
2. Unconscious Agent: The crucial distinction made by the court is that the death was caused through an "unconscious agent". This refers to the nurse's five-year-old child, who was too young to understand the nature or consequences of their actions. The child was acting innocently and without criminal intent.
3. Distinction from Innocent Adult Agent: The court contrasted this scenario with one where the defendant intended to use an innocent adult agent to carry out their criminal plan. While the DPP v Michael facts involve a child, the principle extends to situations where the defendant intends for someone else to administer the substance or perform the act, and that person does so without criminal intent (e.g., mistakenly believing it's harmless or medicine).
4. Intent Remains Key: Despite the intervening act of the child, D's intention to achieve the result of murder remained paramount. D had the necessary mens rea (guilty mind) for murder, intending to cause the death of the child.
5. Foreseeability (Implied): While not explicitly discussed in detail in this excerpt, the decision implies that the defendant's actions created a foreseeable risk of harm. By providing a lethal substance and misrepresenting its nature, D set in motion a chain of events that led to the death, even if the precise mechanism of administration was not what D had originally planned with the nurse.

How to Study This Case:

• Focus on the "Unconscious Agent": Understand why the child's involvement is termed an "unconscious agent" and how this differs from a deliberate act by an adult.
• Identify the Defendant's Role: Emphasize that D's direct act (providing the laudanum with intent) and the resulting death

​KembaraXtra-Case Law- Jordan (1956)
​This case concerns causation in criminal law, specifically whether the defendant's actions were the legal cause of the victim's death when medical intervention played a role.
Case Facts:

• Defendant (D) inflicted a stab wound on the Victim (V).
• V died eight days later in hospital.
• At the time of death, the wound was almost healed.
• V received medical treatment, including:
  • A second dose of a drug to which V was intolerant.
  • Intravenous liquid doses that waterlogged V's lungs.

Legal Issue:

• Was D's action the legal cause of V's death, or did intervening medical treatment break the chain of causation?

Holding:

• D was not guilty of murder.

Reasoning:

• The court held that the medical treatment administered to V was "palpably wrong" (per Hallett J).
• This "palpably wrong" medical treatment was considered to have "precluded" a jury from holding that death was caused by D's action.

Key Takeaway:

• Unforeseen and "palpably wrong" medical intervention can break the chain of causation, meaning the defendant's initial act may not be considered the legal cause of death, even if it initiated the sequence of events.
• This case illustrates the principle that the chain of causation can be broken by an intervening act that is so "palpably wrong" that it becomes the dominant cause of death.

​KembaraXtra-Case Law- PD [1996] CA-Causation in Law
​This case provides a crucial illustration of the principles of causation in criminal law, specifically concerning the operating and significant cause of death.

Key Case: PD [1996] CAFacts:

• Parties: (D) and (V) were drinking companions.
• Accusation: D accused V of molesting D's child.
• The Incident: D slashed V, causing injuries. D subsequently dressed these cuts.
• Vinit's Death: V died two days later.
• Ambiguous Circumstances of Death: It was unclear whether V intentionally reopened the wounds or failed to staunch the blood loss from the wounds inflicted by D.
• Evidence: An apparent suicide note was found.

Legal Issue:

• Could D be held criminally responsible for V's death, given the intervening actions (or inactions) of V?
• Specifically, did D's actions constitute an operating and significant cause of V's death?

Holding:

• The Court held that D was guilty of murder.

Key Principle Established/Reinforced:

• Distinction between Civil and Criminal Causation: Civil law principles of causation should not be imported into criminal law. The standard for criminal causation is different.
• The Test for Criminal Causation (per Rose LJ): The central question to be asked is: "Were the injuries inflicted by the defendant an operating and significant cause of death?"

How to Study This Case:

1. Understand the Facts: Clearly identify who did what to whom and the timeline of events. Pay close attention to the ambiguity surrounding Vinit's death.
2. Identify the Legal Question: What was the central legal problem the court had to resolve?
3. Grasp the Court's Decision: What was the ultimate outcome for David?
4. Memorize the Test: The definition of criminal causation is paramount. Be able to recite and explain the test laid down by Rose LJ: "operating and significant cause."
5. Differentiate: Understand why the court explicitly stated that civil causation principles are irrelevant here. This highlights the unique nature of criminal liability.
6. Apply the Test (Self-Assessment):
   • In this case, why were the injuries inflicted by David considered an "operating and significant cause" even though Vinit may have contributed to his own death?
   • Consider hypothetical scenarios: What if Vinit had a pre-existing medical condition that worsened due to the minor injuries? Would the test still apply?
   • What if Vinit died from an unrelated event two days later? Would David still be guilty? (This would likely fail the "operating and significant cause" test).

Key Takeaway: The focus in criminal law causation is on whether the defendant's actions were a substantial and operative factor in bringing about the prohibited result (death, in this instance). Intervening acts by the victim will not necessarily break the chain of causation if the defendant's initial actions remain a significant cause of the death.

​KembaraXtra-Case Law-Daley (1979) PC: Causation in Manslaughter
​This case establishes an important principle regarding causation when a victim's death results from an escape occasioned by fear induced by the defendant's actions.
Key Principle:

• Foresight of Fear and Escape: If a defendant's actions cause fear in the victim, and this fear leads the victim to attempt an escape, and that escape results in their death, the defendant may be held to have caused the death. This is contingent on the victim's fear and subsequent escape being a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's conduct.

Case Breakdown:

• Facts: D threw stones at V. V, in fear, fled from D. During the flight, V tripped and, as a result of the fall, died.
• Holding: D was found guilty of manslaughter.
• Reasoning: The court held that where injuries leading to death are sustained as a result of an escape, which itself was occasioned by fear caused by the defendant, and where that fear and the subsequent escape were reasonably foreseeable, the defendant will be considered to have caused the fatal result.

Study Points:

1. Causation Beyond Direct Harm: This case demonstrates that causation in criminal law can extend beyond direct physical contact. The defendant's actions, even if not directly inflicting the fatal injury, can establish causation if they create a chain of events leading to death.
2. The Role of Fear as an Intervening Cause: The victim's fear is not necessarily a novus actus interveniens (a new intervening act) that breaks the chain of causation. If the fear and the escape are foreseeable consequences of the defendant's unlawful act, they are considered part of the unbroken chain of causation.
3. Foreseeability is Crucial: The objective test of foreseeability is paramount. The court will ask whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have foreseen that their actions might cause fear, leading to an attempted escape, and that this escape could result in injury or death.
4. Application to Manslaughter: This principle is particularly relevant in cases of involuntary manslaughter, where the defendant's unlawful and dangerous act causes death, but without the intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm.

To Study Effectively:

• Memorise the Principle: Understand and be able to articulate the core principle from Daley (1979).
• Distinguish from Other Cases: Consider how this scenario differs from cases where the victim's actions might be considered entirely independent and unforeseeable.
• Apply the Test: Practice applying the foreseeability test to hypothetical scenarios involving fear and escape.
• Understand the Rationale: Reflect on why the law considers the defendant to have caused the death in such circumstances – it's about holding individuals accountable for the foreseeable consequences of their unlawful and dangerous behaviour.

​KembaraXtra-Case Law- R v Williams and Davis (1992)
​Case Citation: R v Williams and Davis [1992] 3 All ER 411
Key Legal Principle: Causation in Manslaughter - Foreseeability of Victim's Reaction
Scenario:

• The victim (V) was picked up as a hitchhiker by driver (A) and passenger (D).
• V was instructed by A and D to hand over his money.
• In response to this threat, V jumped from the moving car, which was travelling at approximately 30 mph.
• V subsequently died from head injuries sustained as a result of the fall.

Holding:

• The defendants (A and D) were found not guilty of manslaughter.

Reasoning (per Stuart-Smith LJ):
The court established a two-stage test for the jury to consider when determining causation in cases involving a victim's instinctive reaction to a threat, leading to their death:

1. Foreseeability of Some Harm:
   • Was it reasonably foreseeable that some harm (even if not serious harm) was likely to result from the threat made by the defendants?
   • Focus: The inherent nature and impact of the threat itself.
2. Foreseeability of the Victim's Reaction:
   • Was the deceased's reaction (in this case, jumping from the moving car) within the range of responses that might reasonably be expected from a victim placed in that specific situation?
   • Considerations for the Jury:
     • Particular Characteristics of the Victim: The jury should take into account any known characteristics of the deceased (e.g., age, mental state, physical condition).
     • "Agony of the Moment": The jury must remember that a victim under duress might act impulsively, without rational thought or deliberation, in the heat of the moment.

Key Takeaway for Study:
This case highlights that for a defendant to be guilty of manslaughter based on the victim's death resulting from their own actions, the victim's reaction must be reasonably foreseeable in terms of both the possibility of some harm occurring from the threat, and the likelihood that the victim would react in a way that leads to that harm. The law recognizes that victims under threat may act instinctively and that such instinctive reactions, even if seemingly irrational to an observer, can be a natural and foreseeable consequence of the defendant's unlawful act. The jury must consider the circumstances from the victim's perspective, including the "agony of the moment."

​KembaraXtra-Case Law-Cichon v OPP (1994) OBD
​Case: Cichon v OPP (1994) OBD
Key Issue: Availability of the defence of necessity when a law is broken to prevent harm to an animal.
Factual Summary:

• The defendant (D) took a pit bull terrier into a public place without a muzzle.
• D's justification for this action was that the dog had kennel cough, and he believed it would be cruel to muzzle a dog that was coughing.
• D was subsequently convicted of an offence under the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991.
• D attempted to rely on the defence of necessity, but this defence was denied.

Legal Principle and Reasoning:

1. Distinction between Duress and Necessity: The court highlighted a crucial distinction between the defences of duress and necessity:
   • Duress: Involves a situation where the defendant's will is overborne by threats.
   • Necessity: Involves situations where the defendant's freely adopted conduct is justified by the circumstances.
2. Availability of Necessity for Animal Welfare: The central question before the court was whether the defence of necessity could be invoked when the defendant broke the law specifically to avoid serious harm to an animal.
3. Purpose of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991: The Act was legislated with a clear primary purpose:
   • Protection of the Public: The statute's objective was to safeguard the public from the potential dangers posed by certain breeds of dogs.
4. Statutory Exclusion of Necessity: The court determined that the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 itself implicitly or explicitly denied the defence of necessity in this context.
   • The Act did not permit individuals to make a subjective "value judgment" that prioritised the welfare of the dog (avoiding cruelty from a muzzle) over the safety and well-being of the public.
   • Therefore, the statutory framework superseded any common law defence of necessity that might otherwise have been considered.

Outcome:

• The defence of necessity was not available to the defendant.
• The conviction under the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 was upheld.

Key Takeaways for Study:

• Understand the fundamental difference between the defences of duress and necessity.
• Recognise that statutory offences, particularly those designed for public safety, may expressly or implicitly exclude common law defences like necessity.
• Be aware that the courts will scrutinise the underlying purpose and wording of legislation when considering the applicability of defences.
• The defence of necessity is not a general licence to break the law,

​KembaraXtra-Case Law-DPP v Harris (1994)
1. Case Name and Citation:

• DPP v Harris (1994)

2. Factual Background:

• Defendant: A police officer (D).
• Circumstances: D was driving an unmarked police car on police duty, covertly following another vehicle.
• Suspicion: D believed the target vehicle contained individuals planning an armed robbery.
• Offence: D failed to stop at a red traffic light to maintain surveillance on the target vehicle.
• Consequence: D collided with another car.
• Charge: Driving without due care and attention.
• Defence Raised: Necessity.

3. Legal Issue:

• Can the defence of necessity be relied upon for the offence of driving without due care and attention in these circumstances?

4. The Court's Decision (Holding):

• The defence of necessity was not available to the defendant.

5. Reasoning and Key Principles:

• Distinction in Offences: The court distinguished between different driving offences.
  • The defence of duress of circumstances may be available for a charge of reckless driving.
  • However, the present offence of driving without due care and attention was considered less severe and did not attract the defence in this instance.
• Nature of the Offence: The failure to stop at a red light, in this scenario, was described as a minor infringement. The court noted that D could have waited a few seconds and edged forward carefully.
• Requirements for Necessity: The defence of necessity would only apply in exceptional cases.
• Proportionality and Reasonableness: For the defence to succeed, the defendant's actions must have been:
  • Reasonable in the circumstances.
  • Proportionate to the necessity of the situation.

6. Importance and Takeaways for Study:

• Limitations of Necessity: This case demonstrates that the defence of necessity is not a broad get-out clause for all unlawful acts, particularly minor traffic offences.
• Specific Offence Matters: The type of driving offence charged is crucial when considering the applicability of defences like duress of circumstances or necessity.
• High Threshold for Necessity: The defence requires a compelling justification, where the unlawful act was the only reasonable and proportionate means to avert a greater harm. Simply being on police duty or having suspicions is not sufficient to justify a traffic violation.
• Focus on "Exceptional Cases": Reflect on what constitutes an "exceptional case" where necessity might apply to a driving offence. This would likely involve immediate and grave danger that could not be avoided by any lawful means.

7. Further Study Questions:

• What are the key elements of the defence of duress of circumstances? How does it differ from necessity?
• Can you think of hypothetical scenarios where the defence of necessity might successfully be raised for a driving offence? What specific factors would be essential?
• How does the concept of "proportionality" apply to the defence of necessity in criminal law?

​KembaraXtra-Case Law-(Pommell (1995) CA)-The Defence of Necessity
​This guide outlines the key principles and limitations of the defence of necessity as established in Pommell (1995) CA.

Case: Pommell (1995) CAFacts:

• The defendant (D) was convicted of possessing a prohibited weapon and ammunition without a firearms certificate under the Firearms Act 1968.
• D claimed the defence of necessity, stating he took the gun the previous night from an individual threatening others.
• His intention was to surrender the firearm to the police.
• The trial judge disallowed the defence, ruling that D had failed to report to the police immediately.

Legal Issue:

• Can the defence of necessity be raised when the defendant's actions, though intended to prevent immediate harm, do not involve an immediate surrender to authorities?

Held (Court of Appeal Decision):

• Core Principle of Duress/Duress of Circumstances: The underlying rationale of these defences is to permit an individual to contravene the literal wording of the law in exceptional circumstances to avert a "greater evil" befalling themselves.
• Distinction in Application: This defence is not available where the defendant commendably breaks the law with the primary intention of preventing another party from committing a "greater evil."
• Requirement for Desisting: To successfully invoke the defence of duress of circumstances, the defendant must have "desisted from committing the crime as soon as he reasonably [could]" (per Kennedy LJ). This implies an obligation to take reasonable steps to end the unlawful conduct and report to the authorities without undue delay.
• Scope of the Defence: While previous cases concerning necessity primarily involved road traffic offences, the defence is not confined to these situations. Due to its close relationship with the defence of duress, necessity can potentially apply to all criminal offences, with the explicit exceptions of murder and attempted murder.

Key Takeaways for Study:

1. Purpose of Necessity: Understand that necessity permits breaking the law to avoid a greater evil.
2. Self-Preservation vs. Protecting Others: Differentiate between using necessity for personal safety and using it to prevent harm to others. The latter situation has stricter requirements.
3. Immediacy and Reporting: The Pommell case highlights the critical importance of reporting

​KembaraXtra-Case Law- Baker and Wilkins (1997) CA
​Case Name: (often cited as Baker and Wilkins)
Year: 1997
Court: Court of Appeal (CA)
Area of Law: Criminal Law - Defence of Necessity

Brief Facts:

• A couple, Baker (B) and Wilkins (W), had a child together.
• Following their separation, Wilkins was granted limited access to the child.
• During one of these visits, Wilkins failed to return the child to Baker, expressing a fear that the child had been abused.
• Wilkins then informed Baker of an intention to abscond with the child.
• Baker, upon hearing the child crying at Wilkins's residence, forcibly entered the premises.
• Baker was subsequently charged with criminal damage.

Legal Issue:

• Could the defence of necessity be successfully raised for criminal damage committed by breaking into a property, where the motive was to prevent the perceived abuse of a child and the child being unlawfully taken away?

Defence Raised:

• Necessity

Arguments for the Defence:

• Baker argued that the necessity defence was applicable due to:
  • Wilkins's refusal to return the child.
  • Wilkins's threat to abscond with the child.
  • The perceived risk of abuse to the child.

Court's Decision (Held):

• The defence of necessity was not available to Baker.

Reasoning of the Court:

• The Court of Appeal held that the defence of necessity requires a risk of immediate death or serious physical injury.
• In this case, the court found that there was no such immediate risk.
• While the situation involved potential psychological harm to the child, the court did not accept that the need to avoid serious psychological injury constituted a sufficient threat to justify the defence of necessity in criminal damage.

Key Takeaways and Study Points:

• Strict Application of Necessity: This case highlights the narrow scope and strict interpretation of the defence of necessity in English criminal law.
• Focus on Imminent Physical Harm: The defence is primarily concerned with preventing immediate and grave physical dangers, specifically death or serious bodily harm.
• Psychological Harm is Insufficient: The case firmly establishes that the need to prevent psychological harm, even to a child, is generally not a sufficient ground to invoke the defence of necessity for criminal damage.
• Distinguishing from Other Defences: Be aware of how this limitation of necessity differs from other potential defences or legal avenues that might exist in family law or child protection contexts.

​KembaraXtra-Case Law-Cairns (1999) CA
​Area of Law: Criminal Law – Defence of Necessity
Facts:

• The defendant (D) was driving his car late at night.
• The victim (V) climbed onto the bonnet of D's car and lay face-up against the windscreen.
• D, feeling frightened, decided to continue driving, believing it was the best course of action.
• D also claimed to be frightened by V's friends, who were following his car, shouting and gesturing, in an attempt to prevent V from remaining on the bonnet.
• D drove for a considerable distance before V fell off the car.
• Tragically, D then drove over V, causing V to fracture his spine and become paralysed.
• D was charged under section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.
• D sought to rely on the defence of necessity.

Trial Judge's Direction to the Jury:

• The judge instructed the jury that the defence of necessity was only available if D's action was "actually necessary to avoid the evil in question."

Outcome at Trial:

• D was convicted.

Appeal:

• D appealed his conviction.

Decision of the Court of Appeal (CA):

• The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and found that the trial judge had misdirected the jury.
• The jury's focus should have been on D's perception of the threat he faced.
• The jury were to consider whether D's actions were reasonable and proportionate in the circumstances as he perceived them.
• Crucially, the jury did not have to consider whether the threat was real or actual.

Key Legal Principle Established/Reinforced:

• In assessing the defence of necessity, the court will consider the defendant's subjective perception of the threat.
• The defendant's actions must be reasonable and proportionate to the perceived threat, not necessarily to an objectively assessed threat.

Study Points:

1. Understand the factual scenario: Visualise the events as they unfolded.
2. Identify the charge: Know the offence D was accused of.
3. Recognise the defence raised: D's attempt to use necessity.
4. Distinguish the trial judge's direction from the Court of Appeal's direction: This is the central point of the case. What did the judge say, and why was it wrong? What did the Court of Appeal say the jury should have considered?
5. Focus on the "perception of the threat": This is the critical element. D does not need to prove the threat was objectively real, only that he genuinely perceived it as such.
6. Consider "reasonableness and proportionality": Even with a perceived threat, the action taken must be a reasonable response to that threat. This is an objective element applied to the subjective perception.
7. Contrast with objective necessity: The defence of necessity does not require a situation of absolute, objective necessity.

Self-Assessment Questions:

• What were the two main threats D claimed to be facing?
• How did the trial judge instruct the jury on the defence of necessity?
• What was the Court of Appeal's primary criticism of the trial judge's direction?
• Explain the significance of "D's perception of the threat" in the context of the necessity defence, as per this case.
• What two factors did the Court of Appeal state the jury should consider when assessing D's actions?
• Does the threat have to be objectively real for the defence of necessity to be available, according to DPP v Cairns? Explain your answer.