Collins v Godefroy (1831)
Case Summary: This case concerns the enforceability of a contract to pay a witness for attending court. Plaintiff (Collins, an attorney) was subpoenaed by the defendant (Godefroy) to testify in a case. Collins attended for six days but was never called to give evidence. He subsequently sought payment for his lost time. The court held that such a contract is unenforceable.
Key Issue: Does a promise to pay a witness for attending court, even if expressly made, constitute a valid and enforceable contract?
Holding: No. The court found that the promise to pay was without consideration.
Reasoning:

• Legal Duty: The court emphasized that a witness subpoenaed by a court has a legal duty to attend and give evidence. Attendance is not a voluntary act; it's legally mandated.
• Consideration Failure: Because attendance is a pre-existing legal duty, agreeing to pay for fulfilling that duty does not provide fresh consideration for a contract. The witness is already legally obligated to attend, thus their attendance doesn't constitute something new given in exchange for the promise of payment. The promise of payment is therefore gratuitous. The act performed (attending court) is not sufficient consideration because it was already required by law.

Key Concept: Consideration
A contract requires consideration—something of value exchanged by each party. In this case, while the defendant promised payment (apparent consideration from the defendant's perspective), the plaintiff's action (attending court) wasn't considered sufficient consideration because it was already a legal obligation. He gave nothing extra or beyond what was required by law.
Implications:

• Witnesses subpoenaed to court cannot sue for loss of earnings simply for attending, even if a promise of payment was made.
• This case highlights the importance of distinguishing between a pre-existing legal duty and a fresh consideration in contract law. A promise to perform a pre-existing legal duty is generally not sufficient consideration.

1. ​correct the original agreement, aligning it with the parties’ true intent.
2. Consideration for the Supplemental Agreement: The wife’s forbearance from pursuing rectification of the original agreement served as consideration for the supplemental agreement. Even though the husband didn’t explicitly request this forbearance, the wife genuinely believed she had a valid claim for rectification. Her giving up that potential claim constituted sufficient consideration to support the supplemental agreement.

Key Concepts:

• Consideration: Something of value exchanged between parties to a contract. In this case, the wife’s forbearance from legal action to rectify the original agreement was deemed sufficient consideration.
• Agreements Under Seal (Deeds): These agreements are legally binding without the need for consideration. The formality of the seal itself provides the necessary enforceability.
• Rectification: A court order correcting a written document to reflect the parties’ true intentions. The wife could have sought rectification of the original agreement to clarify the tax issue, but instead reached a compromise via the supplemental agreement.

Ward v Byham (1956) CA
This case concerns the enforceability of a father's promise to pay for his child's upkeep. The key question is whether the mother provided sufficient consideration for the father's promise, despite her pre-existing legal duty to care for her child.
Facts:

• 1949-1954: Mother and father cohabit, daughter born in 1950.
• May 1954: Father expels mother, hires neighbour for £1/week childcare.
• July 1954: Mother finds work, requests daughter and £1/week maintenance.
• Father's Offer: Father agrees to pay £1/week provided the child is well cared for, happy, and allowed to choose to live with the mother.
• February 1955: Mother remarries, father stops payments.

Legal Issue: Did the mother provide sufficient consideration for the father's promise to pay £1 per week, given her pre-existing statutory duty to care for her child?
Held: The Court of Appeal held that the mother could enforce the father's promise.
Reasoning: The judges reached the same conclusion but through different reasoning:

• Denning LJ: Argued that performing an existing duty can be good consideration if it confers a practical benefit on the promisor (the father). The father benefitted from the child being looked after well and happily and the father benefitted from being able to avoid the potentially costly and burdensome issues that would arise if the child was not well looked after. This is often considered a more flexible approach to consideration, moving away from strict technicalities. This approach also recognizes that if a person voluntarily promises to pay in order to encourage the performance of an existing duty that they have no legal right to demand, this promise to pay is then binding on the promissor.
• Morris and Parker LJJ: Focused on the terms of the father's letter. They found that the conditions set by the father (well-cared-for child, happy child, child's choice to live with mother) constituted consideration. They didn't specify which condition was the decisive factor, but clearly, the overall effect of the mother's actions went beyond what was merely legally required. This approach is more literal, basing consideration on the specific terms of the agreement.

Key Concepts to Understand:

• Consideration: Something of value given by one party to another in exchange for a promise. This is a necessary element for a legally binding contract.
• Pre-existing Duty: A duty already owed by law (in this case, the mother's statutory duty to care for her child). Traditionally, performing a pre-existing duty was not considered good consideration. However, Ward v Byham demonstrates an exception to this rule.
• Practical Benefit: A benefit that goes beyond the mere performance of a pre-existing duty. Denning LJ’s reasoning focuses on this.
• Performance of conditions: Morris and Parker LJ's reasoning centred on the conditions that the father had imposed as the consideration for his payment.

Williams v Williams (1956) CA
Case Summary: This case concerns a separation agreement between a husband and wife who separated in 1952. The agreement detailed the husband's payment of maintenance to the wife (£1 10s weekly) contingent on her chaste conduct and not initiating legal proceedings (except for divorce). The husband later divorced the wife and failed to fully pay the agreed maintenance. The wife sued to recover the outstanding amount.
Key Issue: Did the wife provide sufficient consideration to make the husband's promise to pay maintenance legally binding?
The Court's Decision: The Court of Appeal held that the wife did provide consideration, upholding the agreement's enforceability.
Analysis of Consideration: The court considered the three clauses of the agreement separately to determine the existence of consideration.

• Clause (3): No Consideration. The wife's promise not to pursue matrimonial proceedings (except divorce) was deemed insufficient consideration. This is because a wife cannot contractually waive her statutory right to apply for maintenance. This clause was deemed unenforceable.
• Clause (2): Consideration Found. The wife's promise to support herself and indemnify the husband against her debts provided consideration. This was a benefit to the husband, even though the wife was already obligated to support herself.
• Overall Consideration (All three Lords Justices): The wife's initial desertion suspended, but did not extinguish, the husband's duty to maintain her. The agreement to accept a reduced sum (£1 10s) was therefore considered a benefit to the husband, particularly considering the possibility of the wife returning, reviving his full maintenance obligation.

Denning LJ's Additional Arguments (Not Shared by Hodson or Morris LJJ): Denning LJ provided two further reasons supporting his decision:

1. Performance of Existing Duty as Consideration: While the wife was already legally obligated to support herself, her promise to do so was still deemed sufficient consideration. This is acceptable, Denning argues, unless it is contrary to public interest. This is a point of contention, as it extends the traditional understanding of consideration.
2. Promise Not to Pledge Husband's Credit as Consideration: Even though the wife had no right to pledge her husband's credit while separated, her promise not to do so was considered valuable consideration. It provided the husband with protection against potential financial trouble and disputes.

Key Principles and Concepts Illustrated:

• Consideration: The case highlights the complexities of defining consideration. The court demonstrates a flexible interpretation, finding consideration in various aspects of the agreement, even if some are based on promises to fulfill existing obligations.
• Existing Duty Rule: Denning LJ's opinion challenges the traditional approach to the existing duty rule, suggesting that even promises to fulfill existing obligations can constitute consideration unless against public policy.
• Separation Agreements: The case offers valuable insight into the legal considerations involved in separation agreements and the criteria for their enforceability.
• Forbearance: Implicit in Clause (3), the wife's forbearance to bring certain legal proceedings, although not valid consideration in itself, informed the court's decision concerning the overall agreement.

Glasbrook Brothers Ltd v Glamorgan County Council (1924)
Case Summary: Glasbrook Brothers, colliery owners, agreed to pay the police £2,200 for special protection (billeting 70 officers at their colliery) during a miners' strike. The police initially suggested mobile patrols were sufficient, but the colliery owners insisted on the garrison. After the strike ended, Glasbrook refused to pay. The court ruled that the police were entitled to the payment.
Core Issue: Did the police provide consideration (something of value exchanged) for the promise of payment? The dispute centered around whether the police had a pre-existing duty to provide the protection. If they did have a duty, the extra protection wasn't consideration; if they didn't, the payment was potentially against public policy (bribery).
Arguments:

• Glasbrook Brothers (Appellants): Argued that the police had a public duty to protect property and therefore providing the garrison wasn't consideration for payment. Alternatively, they claimed that accepting payment for a service they were already obligated to provide was against public policy.
• Glamorgan County Council (Respondents): Argued that while the police had a general duty to maintain order, the specific level of protection requested (a stationary garrison) exceeded that duty. Therefore, providing this extra service constituted valid consideration.

Majority Decision (Viscount Cave LC & Viscount Finlay):

• The police had a power, but not a duty, to provide the special protection requested.
• The extra service provided (stationary garrison beyond standard patrols) constituted valid consideration for the payment.
• Accepting payment in this situation wasn't against public policy, as it fell within their powers. Simply having the power to do something doesn't make accepting payment for it automatically illegal.

Minority Decision (Dissenting Judges):

• The police had a duty to provide the garrison, as this was the only way to effectively protect the colliery from damage due to the withdrawal of safety men (preventing flooding).
• Therefore, the payment was invalid as it was for a service already owed.

Key Concepts:

• Consideration: Something of value exchanged between parties to a contract. It must be sufficient (have some value in the eyes of the law) but doesn't need to be adequate (of equivalent monetary value).
• Pre-existing Duty: Generally, performing a pre-existing public duty doesn't constitute consideration. This case nuances this principle by distinguishing between a general duty and a specific service exceeding that duty.
• Public Policy: The overarching principles of law that protect the public interest. Contracts that are contrary to public policy (e.g., contracts to commit a crime) are unenforceable.
• Power vs. Duty: The police had the power to provide a garrison but were not legally obligated to do so under the circumstances.

Harris v Sheffield United Football Club Ltd (1987) CA
This case centers on the question of consideration – whether the Sheffield United Football Club received something of value in exchange for their promise to pay the police. The core issue was whether the police services provided at football matches constituted "consideration" sufficient to enforce the payment agreement.
I. Key Issue: Did the police provide "consideration" for the Club's promise to pay for their services at football matches?
II. Facts:

• Sheffield United Football Club regularly paid the police for their presence at matches.
• The Club argued that the police were simply performing their general duty (maintaining law and order), thus providing no special consideration for the payment.

III. Decision: The Court of Appeal held that the Club was bound to pay.
IV. Reasoning (applying the principles established in Glasbrook Brothers v Glamorgan County Council):
The court determined that the police services provided at the football matches constituted special police services, going beyond the general duty of maintaining law and order. Four key factors supported this conclusion:

1. Location: Police attendance was at private premises (the football stadium). This distinguishes it from general policing on public streets.
2. Immediacy of Threat: The police presence wasn't in response to actual or imminent violence. It was a proactive measure to prevent potential disorder.
3. Public/Private Nature of Event: Football matches have both public (spectators) and private (club's commercial interest) aspects. The police presence catered to both.
4. Resource Strain: Policing football matches placed a significant burden on police resources, justifying a special charge.

V. Crucial Distinction: The case hinges on the difference between the police's general duty to maintain public order and the provision of special services. The four factors above delineate the distinction. If the police services were simply fulfilling their general duty (e.g., responding to an immediate riot), there would be no special consideration, and the agreement wouldn't be enforceable.
VI. Implications: This case clarifies the circumstances under which police forces can charge for their services. It's not just about the presence of police, but the nature of their deployment and whether it exceeds their general public duty.

Shadwell v Shadwell and Another (1860)
Case Summary: This case concerns a nephew (plaintiff) who sued his uncle's executors (defendants) for unpaid yearly payments promised in a letter. The uncle promised £150 annually until the nephew's income reached 600 guineas, contingent upon his marriage to Ellen Nicholl. The nephew married, but the uncle only paid for 12 years before his death. The dispute centers on whether the nephew provided sufficient consideration for the uncle's promise.
Key Issue: Consideration
The core legal question is whether the nephew's act of marrying provided sufficient consideration to make the uncle's promise legally binding. The defendants argued there was no consideration because the nephew was already engaged and thus legally obligated to marry.
Majority Decision (Erle CJ and Keating J):

• Implied Request: The majority inferred an implied request from the uncle for the nephew to marry from the letter's content and context. The promise of payment was seen as an inducement to proceed with the marriage.
• Consideration Found: The court held that the nephew’s act of marrying, in response to this implied request, constituted valid consideration for the uncle's promise. They essentially treated the nephew's marriage as an act performed at the uncle's request.

Minority Decision (Byles J):

• No Request: Byles J disagreed, arguing the letter only expressed satisfaction with the existing engagement, not a request to marry.
• Pre-Existing Duty: He argued that because the nephew was already engaged (and therefore legally bound to marry), marrying couldn't be considered new consideration. A pre-existing legal obligation cannot serve as consideration for a new contract. Byles J highlighted that a party can hardly claim a prior legal obligation wasn't their determining motive.

Key Points of Byles J's Dissent (Critical for Understanding):

• Distinction between expression of satisfaction and a request: The letter's language was crucial. The majority saw an implied request; Byles J didn't. This highlights the importance of precise legal interpretation.
• Pre-existing duty rule: This is a fundamental principle of contract law. Performing an act you're already obligated to do doesn't constitute consideration. This is not because the act is worthless, but because it doesn't represent a new bargain.

Subsequent Commentary (Jones v Padavatton):
Salmon LJ later expressed doubt about the majority decision in Shadwell v Shadwell, suggesting it was heavily reliant on the letter's interpretation and a pleading point, and that he would have aligned with Byles J's reasoning.
Important Terms:

• Consideration: Something of value exchanged by each party to a contract to make it legally binding.
• Pre-existing duty: A legal obligation already in place; performance of this obligation cannot serve as consideration for a new contract.
• Implied request: A request not explicitly stated but inferred from the circumstances and surrounding communications.
• Obiter dicta: Statements made by a judge that are not essential to the decision of the case but may offer guidance

Scotson & Others v Pegg (1861)
Case Summary: This case centers on the validity of consideration in a contract. The core issue is whether a promise to perform a pre-existing contractual duty owed to a third party constitutes valid consideration for a new contract.
Facts:

• Original Contract: Plaintiffs (Scotson & Others) contracted with third parties to deliver coal. The third parties ordered the coal to be delivered to the defendant (Pegg). This is crucial; it wasn't simply a choice by the plaintiffs, but a direction from the third party.
• New Contract: Plaintiffs made a separate agreement with the defendant, promising to deliver the coal, and the defendant promised to unload it at a rate of 49 tons per day.
• Breach: The defendant failed to unload at the agreed rate.
• Dispute: The defendant argued that the plaintiffs’ promise to deliver the coal (already owed to the third party) wasn't valid consideration for his promise to unload.

Issue: Was the plaintiffs' promise to deliver the coal (a pre-existing duty to a third party) sufficient consideration to support the defendant's promise to unload at a specific rate?
Holding: The court held that the plaintiffs' promise was good consideration. The plaintiffs could enforce the contract against the defendant.
Reasoning:

• Benefit to Defendant: The court emphasized that the defendant received a benefit from the plaintiffs' promise. This benefit stemmed from the potential ambiguity surrounding the plaintiffs' original obligation to the third parties. While the plaintiffs already owed delivery to the third party, there's an implication that the extent of that duty (and whether the plaintiff could be legally compelled to deliver to Pegg specifically) might have been open to question. By contracting directly with Pegg, they removed this ambiguity and gave Pegg certainty.
• No Authority Against Separate Promise: The court explicitly stated there's no legal precedent preventing someone from making a valid promise to perform an action they've already promised to another person. This means just because you are already obligated to do something, doesn't mean you can't make a new enforceable contract about doing it.

Key Concepts:

• Consideration: Something of value exchanged between parties to a contract to make it legally binding. This case highlights that consideration doesn't need to be something new, but it must provide a practical benefit or avoid a practical detriment to the other party.
• Pre-existing Duty: A duty already owed to a third party. This case clarifies that a pre-existing duty can be good consideration if it provides a benefit to the party to whom the promise is made, particularly if there is some element of uncertainty or potential dispute regarding the original obligation.
• Practical Benefit: The key here is the practical benefit to the defendant. The certain delivery guaranteed by the contract with Pegg removed potential risks and provided assurance.

Lampleigh v Brathwait (1615)
Core Issue: This case establishes a crucial principle regarding consideration in contract law: past consideration can be valid if it was performed at the request of the promisor.
Facts:

• Defendant's Act: The defendant committed murder and requested the plaintiff to secure a royal pardon.
• Plaintiff's Act: The plaintiff undertook considerable effort (multiple journeys) to fulfill this request.
• Subsequent Promise: After the plaintiff completed the work, the defendant promised to pay £100.
• Breach: The defendant failed to pay the promised £100.

Legal Question: Was the defendant's promise legally binding despite the plaintiff's actions preceding the promise (past consideration)?
Holding: The plaintiff successfully recovered the £100.
Ratio Decidendi (Reasoning):
The court distinguished between a mere voluntary act (which lacks consideration) and an act performed at the request of the promisor. Key points:

• Mere Voluntary Courtesies: A freely given favour without a prior request does not constitute valid consideration. This is considered "past consideration" and generally unenforceable.
• Requested Acts: However, if the act was performed at the request of the promisor, even if the promise to pay comes after the act, the promise is binding. The promise is not "naked" but connected to the preceding request. This creates a valid consideration, despite the timing. The request implies a promise to compensate.

Key Terms & Definitions:

• Consideration: Something of value exchanged between parties to a contract. It's what each party gives up to make the contract binding.
• Past Consideration: An act completed before a promise is made. Generally, it is not valid consideration. Exception: Lampleigh v Brathwait shows that past consideration is valid if it was performed at the request of the promisor.
• Assumpsit: An action in contract law. In this context, it refers to the promise made by the defendant to pay the plaintiff.

Applying the Rule:
Understanding Lampleigh v Brathwait requires careful analysis of whether a request preceded the act. If there was a clear request, even if the payment promise is later, it’s likely a binding contract. If the act was purely voluntary, there’s no contract.
This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of Lampleigh v Brathwait. By understanding its principles and answering the study questions, you will grasp a key concept in contract law.

Jones v Padavatton (1968) CA
Case Summary: This case concerns a dispute between a mother (Mrs. Jones) and her daughter (Mrs. Padavatton) over a house. The mother promised to support her daughter financially while she studied for the Bar in England. The daughter argues a binding contract existed granting her the right to live in the house, while the mother seeks possession.
Key Issue: The central question is whether a legally binding contract existed between the mother and daughter regarding the daughter's studies and residence in the house.
Court's Decision: The Court of Appeal held that there was no binding contract. The mother was entitled to possession of the house.
Reasoning: The court relied heavily on the principle established in Balfour v Balfour, which states that agreements between close family members are presumed not to be legally binding unless there's clear evidence to the contrary. This presumption is based on the understanding that such arrangements are often based on mutual trust and affection, not a formal legal agreement.
Key Judgments:

• Dankwerts LJ: Emphasized the informal nature of the arrangement, characterizing it as a family agreement dependent on good faith, not a rigid, legally binding contract. He extended the principle of Balfour v Balfour to mother-daughter relationships.
• Fenton Atkinson LJ: Agreed with Dankwerts LJ, finding no legally binding contract.
• Salmon LJ: Explained that there's a presumption against the intention to create legal relations in agreements between close family members (husband and wife, parent and child, etc.). This is a presumption of fact, not law, meaning it can be rebutted by evidence showing a contrary intention. While he acknowledged a possible initial binding agreement regarding the $200 monthly allowance, he found that this agreement had lapsed due to the unreasonable length of time (1962-1968) and the lack of evidence of a new contract arising from the 1964 house purchase.

Points to Understand and Study:

1. Presumption against Intention to Create Legal Relations: This is the core concept. Understand that agreements between family members are presumed not to be legally binding. This is a rebuttable presumption; it can be overturned if sufficient evidence demonstrates an intention to create a legally binding agreement.
2. Rebutting the Presumption: What type of evidence might overturn this presumption? Consider factors such as: a written agreement, significant financial investment, involvement of independent legal advice, specific terms and conditions, and the extent of reliance placed on the agreement by either party. In this case, the lack of these factors supported the presumption.
3. Distinction between Domestic and Commercial Agreements: Contrast the presumption in family arrangements with the presumption in commercial agreements, where the intention to create legal relations is generally presumed.
4. Application of Balfour v Balfour: Understand how this case established a precedent and how its principles were applied in Jones v Padavatton.
5. Certainty and the $200 allowance: Even if a contract regarding the $200 allowance existed, Salmon LJ highlighted the lack of certainty regarding its duration. The open-ended nature made the agreement unenforceable. The passage of time rendered the initial agreement invalid.
6. The Significance of the House: The house purchase was not viewed as creating a new, independent contract. The daughter's continued residence was viewed as part of the original, unenforceable family arrangement.

Merritt v Merritt (1970) CA
This case concerns a dispute between a separating couple over the ownership of their house. Understanding the case hinges on grasping the concept of intention to create legal relations – a crucial element for a valid contract.
I. Facts:

• 1941: Plaintiff (wife) and Defendant (husband) marry.
• 1949: House purchased in husband's name.
• 1966: House transferred into joint names.
• Separation: Husband leaves to live with another woman.
• Agreement: Husband agrees to pay wife £40/month; she pays the mortgage. Husband writes a note promising to transfer the house to her sole ownership once the mortgage is paid.
• Dispute: Wife pays off the mortgage, but husband refuses to transfer the house.

II. Legal Issue: Was there a legally binding contract between the spouses?
The core question is whether the written agreement, made during separation, demonstrated an intention to create legal relations. Generally, agreements between spouses living together are presumed not to be legally binding (due to the intimate relationship). However, this case explores whether that presumption holds during separation.
III. Judgment:
The Court of Appeal held that the husband was obligated to transfer the house. The judges reasoned differently, highlighting the differing approaches to the presumption against intention to create legal relations in domestic agreements:

• Lord Denning MR: He argued that a presumption against intention to create legal relations exists for couples living in amity (harmony), but a presumption in favour of such intention applies during separation negotiations. The serious nature of the separation and the written agreement indicated an intention to be legally bound.
• Widgery LJ: He agreed with the outcome but didn't go as far as Denning LJ in stating a presumption in favour of intention during separation. He found the written agreement and the surrounding circumstances sufficient to establish a binding contract without relying on presumptions.
• Karminski LJ: This judge focused entirely on the surrounding circumstances and found a binding contract without explicitly referencing any presumptions regarding intention to create legal relations.

IV. Key Concepts:

• Intention to Create Legal Relations: This is the crucial element for a valid contract. The courts consider the context (domestic vs. commercial) and the specific facts to determine if the parties intended their agreement to be legally enforceable.
• Presumptions: The court utilizes presumptions (based on common situations) to infer intention. However, these are rebuttable; the specific circumstances of the case can override the presumption.
• Domestic Agreements: Agreements between spouses are often presumed not to be legally binding, especially those made during a harmonious relationship. However, this presumption is weakened or absent during separation or divorce.