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Clarke v. The Earl of Dunraven and Mount: The Satanita (1896) HL The Mudhook Yacht Club announced a regatta scheduled for July 1894 on the Clyde. Participants were required to sign a letter addressed to the secretary of the Club, consenting to adhere to the regulations of the Yacht Club Association. In conjunction with other yacht owners, the two parties, each having executed a letter, registered their yachts, The Satanita and The Valkyrie, for a race. During the race, The Satanita collided with and sank The Valkyrie. The inquiry pertained to the enforceability of the Yacht Club Association's regulations concerning the compensation owed by the owner of the offending vessel to the proprietor of the damaged Valkyrie. The regulations could be upheld.
Per Lord Herschell:
I cannot entertain any doubt that there was a contractual relation between
the parties to this litigation. The effect of their entering for the race, and
undertaking to be bound by these rules to the knowledge of each other, is
sufficient, I think, where those rules indicate a liability on the part of the
one to the other, to create a contractual obligation to discharge that liability.
Per Lord Herschell:
I cannot entertain any doubt that there was a contractual relation between
the parties to this litigation. The effect of their entering for the race, and
undertaking to be bound by these rules to the knowledge of each other, is
sufficient, I think, where those rules indicate a liability on the part of the
one to the other, to create a contractual obligation to discharge that liability.
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Norweb plc v Dixon (1995) Queen's Bench Division Court
Mr. Dixon relocated to a flat and requested Norweb to provide power, which they fulfilled by installing a meter that necessitated the use of electricity payment cards. One year later, Norweb informed Mr. Dixon that he had a debt of £677.86 for energy delivered to the business at 25 Lownorth Road. Mr. Dixon had never resided at 25 Lownorth Road and bore no responsibility for the obligations. Norweb subsequently scheduled an inspection of Mr. Dixon's meter by one of its inspectors. Unbeknownst to Mr. Dixon, the inspector adjusted his meter to necessitate higher payments for reduced electricity consumption in order to recover the 'debt' of £677.86. Due to the heightened electricity charges and multiple correspondences from Norweb, Mr. Dixon experienced significant anxiety and occasionally abstained from food. Upon the revelation of these events, Norweb was accused of the offense of harassing an individual with the intent of coercing payment of a debt purportedly owed under a contract, in violation of section 40 of the Administration of Justice Act 1970. After being sentenced by the magistrates for this offense, Norweb appealed to the Divisional Court, contending that the amount of £677.86 was never asserted 'as a debt owed under a contract' since the agreements for power delivery did not constitute a contract. 26 Proposal and Acceptance The court determined that no contract existed, resulting in the success of Norweb's appeal. In the absence of extraordinary circumstances, Norweb was mandated to provide power under terms predominantly governed by the power Act 1989.
Per Dyson J:
There are many examples of cases where the law to some extent restricts
the freedom of parties to enter into a relationship, but where the
relationship that results is a contract… But, there are other cases in which
a relationship created by legal compulsion is clearly not contractual. Thus,
a person whose property is compulsorily acquired against his will does
not make a contract with the acquiring authority, even though he receives
compensation: see Sovmots Investments Ltd v Secretary of State for the
Environment (1977). In Pfizer Corporation v Ministry of Health (1965), the
House of Lords held that a patient to whom medicines are supplied under
the National Health Service does not make a contract to buy them either
from the chemist or the Minister of Health even if he pays a subscription
charge. The transaction is sui generis, the creation of statute and not a sale
pursuant to a contract… The issue in this case is: which side of the line
does the relationship between a tariff customer and a public electricity
supplier fall? In my judgment, the legal compulsion both as to the creation
of the relationship and the fixing of its terms is inconsistent with the
existence of a contract.
Mr. Dixon relocated to a flat and requested Norweb to provide power, which they fulfilled by installing a meter that necessitated the use of electricity payment cards. One year later, Norweb informed Mr. Dixon that he had a debt of £677.86 for energy delivered to the business at 25 Lownorth Road. Mr. Dixon had never resided at 25 Lownorth Road and bore no responsibility for the obligations. Norweb subsequently scheduled an inspection of Mr. Dixon's meter by one of its inspectors. Unbeknownst to Mr. Dixon, the inspector adjusted his meter to necessitate higher payments for reduced electricity consumption in order to recover the 'debt' of £677.86. Due to the heightened electricity charges and multiple correspondences from Norweb, Mr. Dixon experienced significant anxiety and occasionally abstained from food. Upon the revelation of these events, Norweb was accused of the offense of harassing an individual with the intent of coercing payment of a debt purportedly owed under a contract, in violation of section 40 of the Administration of Justice Act 1970. After being sentenced by the magistrates for this offense, Norweb appealed to the Divisional Court, contending that the amount of £677.86 was never asserted 'as a debt owed under a contract' since the agreements for power delivery did not constitute a contract. 26 Proposal and Acceptance The court determined that no contract existed, resulting in the success of Norweb's appeal. In the absence of extraordinary circumstances, Norweb was mandated to provide power under terms predominantly governed by the power Act 1989.
Per Dyson J:
There are many examples of cases where the law to some extent restricts
the freedom of parties to enter into a relationship, but where the
relationship that results is a contract… But, there are other cases in which
a relationship created by legal compulsion is clearly not contractual. Thus,
a person whose property is compulsorily acquired against his will does
not make a contract with the acquiring authority, even though he receives
compensation: see Sovmots Investments Ltd v Secretary of State for the
Environment (1977). In Pfizer Corporation v Ministry of Health (1965), the
House of Lords held that a patient to whom medicines are supplied under
the National Health Service does not make a contract to buy them either
from the chemist or the Minister of Health even if he pays a subscription
charge. The transaction is sui generis, the creation of statute and not a sale
pursuant to a contract… The issue in this case is: which side of the line
does the relationship between a tariff customer and a public electricity
supplier fall? In my judgment, the legal compulsion both as to the creation
of the relationship and the fixing of its terms is inconsistent with the
existence of a contract.
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Dickinson v Dodds (1876) CA
The defendant submitted a written proposal to sell the plaintiff certain land for £800, including the postscript, 'this offer to remain valid until Friday at 9:00 am, 12 June 1874.' Both sides held the view that the postscript was obligatory for the defendant. On the morning of 11 June, the plaintiff resolved to accept the offer. That afternoon, the plaintiff was informed by a third party that the defendant had been 'offering or negotiating' to sell the property to one Thomas Allan. The defendant finalized a sales contract with Allan on 11 June. On that evening, the plaintiff attempted to reach the defendant and successfully communicated his acceptance of the offer at 7:00 AM on 12 June
. The court determined that no contract existed between the plaintiff and the respondent. The defendant's commitment to maintain the offer until 12 June was made without contemplation, rendering it non-binding. (II) An offeree cannot accept an offer once they are aware that it has been retracted (according to James LJ) or that the property has been sold (according to Mellish LJ).
The defendant submitted a written proposal to sell the plaintiff certain land for £800, including the postscript, 'this offer to remain valid until Friday at 9:00 am, 12 June 1874.' Both sides held the view that the postscript was obligatory for the defendant. On the morning of 11 June, the plaintiff resolved to accept the offer. That afternoon, the plaintiff was informed by a third party that the defendant had been 'offering or negotiating' to sell the property to one Thomas Allan. The defendant finalized a sales contract with Allan on 11 June. On that evening, the plaintiff attempted to reach the defendant and successfully communicated his acceptance of the offer at 7:00 AM on 12 June
. The court determined that no contract existed between the plaintiff and the respondent. The defendant's commitment to maintain the offer until 12 June was made without contemplation, rendering it non-binding. (II) An offeree cannot accept an offer once they are aware that it has been retracted (according to James LJ) or that the property has been sold (according to Mellish LJ).
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Ramsgate Victoria Hotel v Montefiore (1866) Court of Exchequer
The plaintiff corporation was established on June 6, 1864. On 8 June, the defendant proposed to purchase 50 shares. On 23 November, the directors allocated the shares and communicated to the defendant their acceptance of his offer. The court determined that the defendant was not obligated to purchase the shares. The allocation must occur within a reasonable timeframe, and the period from June to November was deemed unreasonable.
The plaintiff corporation was established on June 6, 1864. On 8 June, the defendant proposed to purchase 50 shares. On 23 November, the directors allocated the shares and communicated to the defendant their acceptance of his offer. The court determined that the defendant was not obligated to purchase the shares. The allocation must occur within a reasonable timeframe, and the period from June to November was deemed unreasonable.
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Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co (1893) Court of Appeal
The defendants proclaimed they would compensate £100 to any individual who developed influenza after utilizing their smokeball thrice daily for a fortnight, asserting that £1,000 was deposited with the Alliance Bank to demonstrate their seriousness in the matter. The plaintiff utilized the smokeball as instructed and contracted influenza, after which the defendants refused to disburse the £100. The court determined that the plaintiff had a valid claim for £100 against the defendants for the following grounds. The advertisement constituted more than a mere puff or an invitation to treat; it could be regarded as an offer to the general public. According to Bowen LJ: 'Why should an offer not be extended to the entire world, maturing into a contract with anybody who fulfills the stipulated condition?' (II) 1.2.3 An offeror may waive the requirement for notice of acceptance or designate its method.
…in a case of this kind…the person who makes the offer shews by his
language and from the nature of the transaction that he does not expect
and does not require notice of the acceptance apart from notice of the
performance.
The defendants requested that the plaintiff utilize the ball, and the plaintiff's utilization constituted adequate compensation for the defendants' promise. The inconvenience experienced by one party at the request of the other constitutes adequate consideration.
The defendants proclaimed they would compensate £100 to any individual who developed influenza after utilizing their smokeball thrice daily for a fortnight, asserting that £1,000 was deposited with the Alliance Bank to demonstrate their seriousness in the matter. The plaintiff utilized the smokeball as instructed and contracted influenza, after which the defendants refused to disburse the £100. The court determined that the plaintiff had a valid claim for £100 against the defendants for the following grounds. The advertisement constituted more than a mere puff or an invitation to treat; it could be regarded as an offer to the general public. According to Bowen LJ: 'Why should an offer not be extended to the entire world, maturing into a contract with anybody who fulfills the stipulated condition?' (II) 1.2.3 An offeror may waive the requirement for notice of acceptance or designate its method.
…in a case of this kind…the person who makes the offer shews by his
language and from the nature of the transaction that he does not expect
and does not require notice of the acceptance apart from notice of the
performance.
The defendants requested that the plaintiff utilize the ball, and the plaintiff's utilization constituted adequate compensation for the defendants' promise. The inconvenience experienced by one party at the request of the other constitutes adequate consideration.
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Bowerman v The Association
The plaintiffs arranged a school skiing holiday through a travel agent affiliated with the defendant Association, ABTA. The travel firm became insolvent, and an alternative holiday was supplied, financed by ABTA. Nevertheless, ABTA declined to refund the travel insurance cost of £10 per individual. This was the plaintiffs' assertion for the amount of £10 each. The plaintiffs depended on the notice they observed in the travel agent's premises, titled 'Notice Describing ABTA's Scheme of Protection Against the Financial Failure of ABTA Members.' Paragraph 5 of the notification states the following:
Where holidays or other travel arrangements have not yet commenced at
the time of failure, ABTA arranges for you to be reimbursed the money
you have paid in respect of your holiday arrangements. In some instances,
ABTA may, however, be able to arrange for the existing arrangements to
proceed as planned or offer similar or alternative arrangements.
Held the plaintiffs’ claim succeeded. (I) Paragraph 5 of the notice was wide
enough to cover the insurance payments. (II) The ABTA notice as a whole
contained (per Waite LJ) a ‘bewildering miscellany…of information,
promise, disclaimer and reassurance…’. However, it ‘would be understood
by the ordinary member of the public as importing an intention to create
legal relations with customers of ABTA members’. Per Hobhouse LJ, the
notice was not ‘simply telling the public about the scheme which ABTA
has for its own members’ but ‘goes further than this and contains an offer
which a member of the public can take up and hold ABTA to should the
ABTA member with whom the member of the public is dealing fail
financially’. Per Hobhouse LJ, the arguments of ABTA echoed those of the
defendant in Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co (1.4.1) and failed for similar
reasons. The consideration given by the customer to ABTA is entering into
a contract with the ABTA member, which is a collateral contract analogous
to the contract in Shanklin Pier Ltd v Detel Products Ltd
The plaintiffs arranged a school skiing holiday through a travel agent affiliated with the defendant Association, ABTA. The travel firm became insolvent, and an alternative holiday was supplied, financed by ABTA. Nevertheless, ABTA declined to refund the travel insurance cost of £10 per individual. This was the plaintiffs' assertion for the amount of £10 each. The plaintiffs depended on the notice they observed in the travel agent's premises, titled 'Notice Describing ABTA's Scheme of Protection Against the Financial Failure of ABTA Members.' Paragraph 5 of the notification states the following:
Where holidays or other travel arrangements have not yet commenced at
the time of failure, ABTA arranges for you to be reimbursed the money
you have paid in respect of your holiday arrangements. In some instances,
ABTA may, however, be able to arrange for the existing arrangements to
proceed as planned or offer similar or alternative arrangements.
Held the plaintiffs’ claim succeeded. (I) Paragraph 5 of the notice was wide
enough to cover the insurance payments. (II) The ABTA notice as a whole
contained (per Waite LJ) a ‘bewildering miscellany…of information,
promise, disclaimer and reassurance…’. However, it ‘would be understood
by the ordinary member of the public as importing an intention to create
legal relations with customers of ABTA members’. Per Hobhouse LJ, the
notice was not ‘simply telling the public about the scheme which ABTA
has for its own members’ but ‘goes further than this and contains an offer
which a member of the public can take up and hold ABTA to should the
ABTA member with whom the member of the public is dealing fail
financially’. Per Hobhouse LJ, the arguments of ABTA echoed those of the
defendant in Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co (1.4.1) and failed for similar
reasons. The consideration given by the customer to ABTA is entering into
a contract with the ABTA member, which is a collateral contract analogous
to the contract in Shanklin Pier Ltd v Detel Products Ltd
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Legal Terms - dog-leg” claim
A claim for *breach of trust by a beneficiary against the directors of a *trust corporation. The directors would not, under normal company law principles, be potential targets for a trust beneficiary; the directors ordinarily owe duties solely to the company, the trust corporation. However, in circumstances where the trust corporation is not prepared or able to pursue its own directors for breach of *fiduciary duty and has no assets out of which a claim by beneficiaries for breach of trust may be satisfied, the beneficiaries may wish to pursue the directors of the trust corporation directly. The “dog-leg” claim has been used in an attempt to circumvent the general principle that a director cannot be pursued personally for a breach of duty to the company; it argues that a claim for breach of trust arising because of the breach of duty by individual directors of a trust corporation is held on trust for the beneficiaries. Such a claim has, however, received a very lukewarm reception. A “dog-leg” claim was considered arguable in HA v JAPT [1997] OPLR 123; however, other attempts to assert such a claim have failed (Gregson v HAE Trustees [2008] EWHC 1006 (Ch), [2008] WLR (D)146; Alhamrani v Alhamrani [2007] JRC 026 (a decision of the Royal Court of Jersey)).
A claim for *breach of trust by a beneficiary against the directors of a *trust corporation. The directors would not, under normal company law principles, be potential targets for a trust beneficiary; the directors ordinarily owe duties solely to the company, the trust corporation. However, in circumstances where the trust corporation is not prepared or able to pursue its own directors for breach of *fiduciary duty and has no assets out of which a claim by beneficiaries for breach of trust may be satisfied, the beneficiaries may wish to pursue the directors of the trust corporation directly. The “dog-leg” claim has been used in an attempt to circumvent the general principle that a director cannot be pursued personally for a breach of duty to the company; it argues that a claim for breach of trust arising because of the breach of duty by individual directors of a trust corporation is held on trust for the beneficiaries. Such a claim has, however, received a very lukewarm reception. A “dog-leg” claim was considered arguable in HA v JAPT [1997] OPLR 123; however, other attempts to assert such a claim have failed (Gregson v HAE Trustees [2008] EWHC 1006 (Ch), [2008] WLR (D)146; Alhamrani v Alhamrani [2007] JRC 026 (a decision of the Royal Court of Jersey)).
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Legal Terms - doli capax
Capable of wrong. A youngster below the age of 10 is considered incapable of criminal responsibility. Children above the age of 10
are doli capax and are regarded as adults, although they are typically adjudicated in specialized child courts (with the exception of homicide and some other serious offenses) and subjected to distinct penalties. Formerly, there was a rebuttable presumption that a kid between the ages of 10 and 14 was likewise doli incapax (incapable of wrong). This assumption has been eliminated (Crime and Disorder Act 1998 s 34).
Capable of wrong. A youngster below the age of 10 is considered incapable of criminal responsibility. Children above the age of 10
are doli capax and are regarded as adults, although they are typically adjudicated in specialized child courts (with the exception of homicide and some other serious offenses) and subjected to distinct penalties. Formerly, there was a rebuttable presumption that a kid between the ages of 10 and 14 was likewise doli incapax (incapable of wrong). This assumption has been eliminated (Crime and Disorder Act 1998 s 34).
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Legal Terms - domain name
An Internet address that may be safeguarded under trademark law
An Internet address that may be safeguarded under trademark law
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Legal Terms -domestic premises
A private dwelling utilized only for residential purposes, including with its garden, yard, and other structures (such as garages and outbuildings).
A private dwelling utilized only for residential purposes, including with its garden, yard, and other structures (such as garages and outbuildings).
