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Legal Terms - Absence
Absence refers to the state of not being present, particularly in the context of legal proceedings. Default refers to the absence of a party involved in a legal case or a person who has been called to testify. Part 39 of the *Civil Procedure Rules outlines the repercussions that occur when a party does not show up for the trial in civil procedures. Under the Magistrate Courts Act 1980, a summary trial can occur without the presence of the accused or the prosecutor in criminal proceedings. The discretion of a Crown Court judge to start a trial on indictment without the presence of the accused should be utilized very carefully and cautiously (R v Jones [2002] UKHL 5, [2003] 1 AC 1).
Absence refers to the state of not being present, particularly in the context of legal proceedings. Default refers to the absence of a party involved in a legal case or a person who has been called to testify. Part 39 of the *Civil Procedure Rules outlines the repercussions that occur when a party does not show up for the trial in civil procedures. Under the Magistrate Courts Act 1980, a summary trial can occur without the presence of the accused or the prosecutor in criminal proceedings. The discretion of a Crown Court judge to start a trial on indictment without the presence of the accused should be utilized very carefully and cautiously (R v Jones [2002] UKHL 5, [2003] 1 AC 1).
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Legal Terms - Abscond
Absconding refers to the act of intentionally evading judicial procedures by not surrendering to the custody of a court.
Absconding refers to the act of intentionally evading judicial procedures by not surrendering to the custody of a court.
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Legal Terms - Abandonment
1. The act of ceding a legal right, especially a property ownership right. Abandoned property is res nullius, or something that belongs to no one, and whomever takes possession of it thereby gains a legal title. When it is proven that the original owner has thrown something away and doesn't care what happens to it, it is considered abandoned and cannot be the subject of a theft case.
But property that has been deposited in a dustbin by its owner is not abandoned; rather, it is there to be gathered as waste. Abandonment in the context of maritime insurance refers to giving up entire ownership of a ship or cargo in the event of a *constructive total loss. To achieve this, the insured party must give the insurer a notice of abandonment within an acceptable time frame. By doing this, the insured party gives the insurer all of his rights to the ship and its contents and is entitled to handle the loss as though it were a true total loss.
2. The giving up of all or a portion of a claim stated in an action or an appeal in civil litigation. According to Part 38 of the *Civil Procedure Rules, any claim is now deemed abandoned if a *notice of discontinuance is served.
3. The crime of a parent or guardian abandoning a minor to fend for themselves. If the parent is aware of and agrees with the actions being taken by someone else to care for their child, then the child is not considered abandoned. If a parent is found guilty of abandoning, the court may permit the adoption of the kid without the parent's consent.
1. The act of ceding a legal right, especially a property ownership right. Abandoned property is res nullius, or something that belongs to no one, and whomever takes possession of it thereby gains a legal title. When it is proven that the original owner has thrown something away and doesn't care what happens to it, it is considered abandoned and cannot be the subject of a theft case.
But property that has been deposited in a dustbin by its owner is not abandoned; rather, it is there to be gathered as waste. Abandonment in the context of maritime insurance refers to giving up entire ownership of a ship or cargo in the event of a *constructive total loss. To achieve this, the insured party must give the insurer a notice of abandonment within an acceptable time frame. By doing this, the insured party gives the insurer all of his rights to the ship and its contents and is entitled to handle the loss as though it were a true total loss.
2. The giving up of all or a portion of a claim stated in an action or an appeal in civil litigation. According to Part 38 of the *Civil Procedure Rules, any claim is now deemed abandoned if a *notice of discontinuance is served.
3. The crime of a parent or guardian abandoning a minor to fend for themselves. If the parent is aware of and agrees with the actions being taken by someone else to care for their child, then the child is not considered abandoned. If a parent is found guilty of abandoning, the court may permit the adoption of the kid without the parent's consent.
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Legal Terms - Abatement
1. in the context of debts, refers to the proportional reduction in the payment of debts when a person's assets are not enough to fully settle with their creditors.
2. (pertaining to legacies) The diminishment or annulment of legacies. When the assets of a solvent estate are not enough to fully satisfy all the specified inheritances mentioned in the will or in the absence of a will, after the deceased person's debts have been paid. According to the Administration of Estates Act 1925 (schedule 1 part II), general legacies are reduced proportionally unless they are intended to pay off a debt. Specific and demonstrative legacies are then reduced if the estate does not have enough money to pay off all debts. A demonstrative legacy is also reduced if the specified fund is not enough to cover it. As an illustration, A's estate consists of a painting, £3,000 in a savings account, and £7,000 in other funds. However, there are debts amounting to £1,000. According to A's will, the picture is bequeathed to B, £5,000 from the savings account goes to C, £8,000 is allocated to D, and £2,000 is designated for E. B will inherit the picture. C's demonstrative legacy decreases to £3,000. After the debts are settled with the remaining £7,000, D's and E's general legacies decrease proportionally to £4,800 and £1,200 respectively. When annuities are bequeathed in a will, they are typically evaluated at the time of the testator's death. They then decrease proportionally based on that valuation, and each annuitant receives the reduced amount. These rules can be overridden if the will expresses a different intention.
3. In the context of land law, an abatement refers to the decrease or cancellation of a monetary payment. For instance, a lease agreement may include a provision for a reduction in rent under specific conditions, such as if the building is damaged by fire. Similarly, a buyer of land may request a reduction in the price if the seller can only show possession of a portion of the land that was originally agreed upon for sale.
4. (pertaining to nuisances) The act of terminating, removing, or annihilating an annoyance. An individual harmed by a disturbance possesses the legal entitlement to eliminate it. While addressing the issue, it is important for him to minimize any additional harm and, if accessing the property where the problem originates is necessary, he will typically need to inform the person causing the problem. A local authority has the power to issue an abatement notice in order to regulate and manage statutory nuisances.
5. (of proceedings) Previously, the conclusion of civil proceedings due to a change in interest or status (such as bankruptcy or death) of one of the parties after the procedures have begun but before they are completed, as a result of the operation of law. An abatement did not prohibit either party from initiating new legal procedures regarding the same legal claim. The practice of pleas in abatement has been eliminated. In current practice, any change in the parties' interest or status does not impact the legitimacy of the proceedings, as long as the cause of action remains valid.
1. in the context of debts, refers to the proportional reduction in the payment of debts when a person's assets are not enough to fully settle with their creditors.
2. (pertaining to legacies) The diminishment or annulment of legacies. When the assets of a solvent estate are not enough to fully satisfy all the specified inheritances mentioned in the will or in the absence of a will, after the deceased person's debts have been paid. According to the Administration of Estates Act 1925 (schedule 1 part II), general legacies are reduced proportionally unless they are intended to pay off a debt. Specific and demonstrative legacies are then reduced if the estate does not have enough money to pay off all debts. A demonstrative legacy is also reduced if the specified fund is not enough to cover it. As an illustration, A's estate consists of a painting, £3,000 in a savings account, and £7,000 in other funds. However, there are debts amounting to £1,000. According to A's will, the picture is bequeathed to B, £5,000 from the savings account goes to C, £8,000 is allocated to D, and £2,000 is designated for E. B will inherit the picture. C's demonstrative legacy decreases to £3,000. After the debts are settled with the remaining £7,000, D's and E's general legacies decrease proportionally to £4,800 and £1,200 respectively. When annuities are bequeathed in a will, they are typically evaluated at the time of the testator's death. They then decrease proportionally based on that valuation, and each annuitant receives the reduced amount. These rules can be overridden if the will expresses a different intention.
3. In the context of land law, an abatement refers to the decrease or cancellation of a monetary payment. For instance, a lease agreement may include a provision for a reduction in rent under specific conditions, such as if the building is damaged by fire. Similarly, a buyer of land may request a reduction in the price if the seller can only show possession of a portion of the land that was originally agreed upon for sale.
4. (pertaining to nuisances) The act of terminating, removing, or annihilating an annoyance. An individual harmed by a disturbance possesses the legal entitlement to eliminate it. While addressing the issue, it is important for him to minimize any additional harm and, if accessing the property where the problem originates is necessary, he will typically need to inform the person causing the problem. A local authority has the power to issue an abatement notice in order to regulate and manage statutory nuisances.
5. (of proceedings) Previously, the conclusion of civil proceedings due to a change in interest or status (such as bankruptcy or death) of one of the parties after the procedures have begun but before they are completed, as a result of the operation of law. An abatement did not prohibit either party from initiating new legal procedures regarding the same legal claim. The practice of pleas in abatement has been eliminated. In current practice, any change in the parties' interest or status does not impact the legitimacy of the proceedings, as long as the cause of action remains valid.
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Legal Terms - Ab Intestato
Ab intestato is a Latin term that means "from an intestate". Describing the process of inheriting assets from an individual who passes away without a legally recognized will.
Ab intestato is a Latin term that means "from an intestate". Describing the process of inheriting assets from an individual who passes away without a legally recognized will.
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Legal Terms - Abortion
Abortion is the medical procedure of removing an embryo or fetus from the uterus at a specific stage of development.
During pregnancy, when a fetus is considered unable to survive on its own (also known as non-viable). According to section 58 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, abortion is considered a criminal act unless it is done in accordance with the regulations stated in the Abortion Act 1967. The Abortion Act 1967 specifies the conditions under which a termination is considered legal, as outlined in section 1. In general, a termination is considered legal if the pregnancy is within 24 weeks and if continuing the pregnancy would pose a higher risk to the bodily or mental health of the pregnant woman compared to having an abortion. Under certain conditions, a termination may be allowed after 24 weeks. This includes cases where there is a significant danger that the child, if delivered, will have severe disabilities, or if continuing the pregnancy would result in serious and permanent harm to the physical or mental health of the pregnant mother. The abortion procedure must be conducted in a hospital or clinic that has been officially authorized. Additionally, two medical professionals must provide certification that the termination is required for one of the specific reasons outlined in the legislation. The differentiation between abortion and contraception is of utmost importance. In the case of Smeaton on behalf of SPUC v Secretary of State for Health [2002] EWHC 610 (Admin), [2002] 2 FLR 146, the High Court determined that the use of the "morning after pill", which hinders the implantation of a fertilized egg in the uterus, does not qualify as an abortion. Physicians are not required to carry out abortions if they can provide evidence of a conscientious objection to doing so. According to the case of C v S [1988] QB 135, a husband does not have the authority to prevent his wife from obtaining a lawful abortion if she desires to do so.
Abortion is the medical procedure of removing an embryo or fetus from the uterus at a specific stage of development.
During pregnancy, when a fetus is considered unable to survive on its own (also known as non-viable). According to section 58 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, abortion is considered a criminal act unless it is done in accordance with the regulations stated in the Abortion Act 1967. The Abortion Act 1967 specifies the conditions under which a termination is considered legal, as outlined in section 1. In general, a termination is considered legal if the pregnancy is within 24 weeks and if continuing the pregnancy would pose a higher risk to the bodily or mental health of the pregnant woman compared to having an abortion. Under certain conditions, a termination may be allowed after 24 weeks. This includes cases where there is a significant danger that the child, if delivered, will have severe disabilities, or if continuing the pregnancy would result in serious and permanent harm to the physical or mental health of the pregnant mother. The abortion procedure must be conducted in a hospital or clinic that has been officially authorized. Additionally, two medical professionals must provide certification that the termination is required for one of the specific reasons outlined in the legislation. The differentiation between abortion and contraception is of utmost importance. In the case of Smeaton on behalf of SPUC v Secretary of State for Health [2002] EWHC 610 (Admin), [2002] 2 FLR 146, the High Court determined that the use of the "morning after pill", which hinders the implantation of a fertilized egg in the uterus, does not qualify as an abortion. Physicians are not required to carry out abortions if they can provide evidence of a conscientious objection to doing so. According to the case of C v S [1988] QB 135, a husband does not have the authority to prevent his wife from obtaining a lawful abortion if she desires to do so.
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Introduction to Offer and Acceptance (Objective and Subjective Tests)
Two of the four components needed to create a legally enforceable contract are the offer and the acceptance. The aim to establish legal relations and consideration are the other components. An offer must be made and accepted by the offeree in order for there to be a legally enforceable agreement.
Important word: offeror
The offeror is the one who extends the offer.
Important word: offeree
The offeree is the individual to whom the offer is made.
The objective test
When determining whether there is a legally binding agreement between the parties, the courts typically apply an objective test. This implies that the way a reasonable person would interpret the parties' interactions is taken into account by the courts.
Important phrase: the objective examination
The courts apply an objective criteria to ascertain whether an agreement has been made. The interaction between the parties is examined by the courts from the perspective of a reasonable person.
The subjective test
When determining whether an agreement exists, the courts use a subjective test rather than an objective test under certain conditions.
When the offeree should have known or knew that the offeror committed a mistake, the subjective test is used. For instance, in situations when the offeree is aware that the offeror does not intend for the conditions of the offer to be what the terms' plain meaning would imply. This exception to the general rule is crucial to keep in mind since it states that the offeror is not obligated to follow the terms of the contract if it can be demonstrated that the offeree knew or should have known that the offeror is erroneous. Keep in mind that this exception only applies if the error concerns a contractual term (like the price) as opposed to an incidental issue (like the item's color).
Illustration
Roland is a lobster vendor. He has previously corresponded with Diana, offering to sell her a shipment of lobsters for £50 apiece. He erroneously offers to sell her the entire shipment of crabs for £50 two weeks later. Diana agrees to the deal, but Roland won't sell her the £50 consignment of lobsters after realizing his error.
Is Diana able to make Roland sell her the shipment of crabs for fifty pounds?
If Roland can present the court with proof that Diana knew, or had to know, that his offer was incorrect and that Diana could not have reasonably assumed that the offer represented Roland's true intention, then the answer is negative. In situations such as these, the courts will determine that Diana knew, or should have known, that Roland was mistaken and that Roland will not be obligated to sell Diana the entire consignment of lobsters for £50 if the evidence demonstrates that: the market practice for selling lobsters is to sell them at a price per lobster, and there is a substantial difference between the price per lobster and the price per consignment, and there is previous correspondence from Roland to sell at a price per lobster.
Two of the four components needed to create a legally enforceable contract are the offer and the acceptance. The aim to establish legal relations and consideration are the other components. An offer must be made and accepted by the offeree in order for there to be a legally enforceable agreement.
Important word: offeror
The offeror is the one who extends the offer.
Important word: offeree
The offeree is the individual to whom the offer is made.
The objective test
When determining whether there is a legally binding agreement between the parties, the courts typically apply an objective test. This implies that the way a reasonable person would interpret the parties' interactions is taken into account by the courts.
Important phrase: the objective examination
The courts apply an objective criteria to ascertain whether an agreement has been made. The interaction between the parties is examined by the courts from the perspective of a reasonable person.
The subjective test
When determining whether an agreement exists, the courts use a subjective test rather than an objective test under certain conditions.
When the offeree should have known or knew that the offeror committed a mistake, the subjective test is used. For instance, in situations when the offeree is aware that the offeror does not intend for the conditions of the offer to be what the terms' plain meaning would imply. This exception to the general rule is crucial to keep in mind since it states that the offeror is not obligated to follow the terms of the contract if it can be demonstrated that the offeree knew or should have known that the offeror is erroneous. Keep in mind that this exception only applies if the error concerns a contractual term (like the price) as opposed to an incidental issue (like the item's color).
Illustration
Roland is a lobster vendor. He has previously corresponded with Diana, offering to sell her a shipment of lobsters for £50 apiece. He erroneously offers to sell her the entire shipment of crabs for £50 two weeks later. Diana agrees to the deal, but Roland won't sell her the £50 consignment of lobsters after realizing his error.
Is Diana able to make Roland sell her the shipment of crabs for fifty pounds?
If Roland can present the court with proof that Diana knew, or had to know, that his offer was incorrect and that Diana could not have reasonably assumed that the offer represented Roland's true intention, then the answer is negative. In situations such as these, the courts will determine that Diana knew, or should have known, that Roland was mistaken and that Roland will not be obligated to sell Diana the entire consignment of lobsters for £50 if the evidence demonstrates that: the market practice for selling lobsters is to sell them at a price per lobster, and there is a substantial difference between the price per lobster and the price per consignment, and there is previous correspondence from Roland to sell at a price per lobster.
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Norfolk County Council v. Dencora Properties (1995) CA
The defendant corporation leased certain offices to the plaintiff council.
Tenant may change the terms of the 20-year lease after ten years, but only with two years' notice to the landlord. In order to dissolve the lease after 10 years as opposed to 20 years, the council had to submit notice by March 25, 1993, as the first 10 years would expire on that date. To allow the council more freedom to decide, the council sought the landlord to change the terms of the lease in late 1992.
In response, the landlord said:
In order to assist, we are prepared to postpone the notice period to break the lease to 1995 or 1996, but not both. The two year notice must remain.
The council then wrote to the landlord:
It is difficult therefore to forecast with any precision, but doing the best I can, it would seem that to be required to vacate in March 1997 cuts it too fine, and to vacate in March 1998 may be too long. I appreciate your assistance to date and agree to the two year notice, but ask if this could be given at any time but not earlier than March 1995. We could then gauge with some accuracy when the police should vacate Dencora House…
After the landlord turned down the council's proposal, the council attempted to accept the landlord's 1998 lease break offer by giving notice in 1996. The landlord, however, stated that its previous offer was no longer valid.
As in Hyde v. Wrench (1.2.1), it was held that the letter from the council that was cited above was a rejection of the landlord's offer along with a counter offer. The council's use of the interrogatory language, "but ask if this could be given," prevented the letter from falling into the same category as a simple question as that in Stevenson, Jacques & Co v. McLean (1.2.2). Thus, no agreement to change the conditions of the lease had been made.
The defendant corporation leased certain offices to the plaintiff council.
Tenant may change the terms of the 20-year lease after ten years, but only with two years' notice to the landlord. In order to dissolve the lease after 10 years as opposed to 20 years, the council had to submit notice by March 25, 1993, as the first 10 years would expire on that date. To allow the council more freedom to decide, the council sought the landlord to change the terms of the lease in late 1992.
In response, the landlord said:
In order to assist, we are prepared to postpone the notice period to break the lease to 1995 or 1996, but not both. The two year notice must remain.
The council then wrote to the landlord:
It is difficult therefore to forecast with any precision, but doing the best I can, it would seem that to be required to vacate in March 1997 cuts it too fine, and to vacate in March 1998 may be too long. I appreciate your assistance to date and agree to the two year notice, but ask if this could be given at any time but not earlier than March 1995. We could then gauge with some accuracy when the police should vacate Dencora House…
After the landlord turned down the council's proposal, the council attempted to accept the landlord's 1998 lease break offer by giving notice in 1996. The landlord, however, stated that its previous offer was no longer valid.
As in Hyde v. Wrench (1.2.1), it was held that the letter from the council that was cited above was a rejection of the landlord's offer along with a counter offer. The council's use of the interrogatory language, "but ask if this could be given," prevented the letter from falling into the same category as a simple question as that in Stevenson, Jacques & Co v. McLean (1.2.2). Thus, no agreement to change the conditions of the lease had been made.
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Stevenson, Jaques & Co. v. McLean, 1880
The sequence of events was as follows. (1) The plaintiff buyer received an offer from the defendant seller to purchase a quantity of iron for "40s, nett cash, open till Monday." The buyer sent a telegraph to the seller at 9:42 on Monday morning, asking them to confirm if they would accept forty for delivery over a two-month period, or if not, what the longest limit they would allow. (3) The buyer sent a telegraph to the seller, who did not respond. (4) A third party purchased the iron from the merchant. (5) The seller informed the buyer by telegram that he had sold the iron at 1:25 p.m. (6) The buyer and seller sent a telegraph at 1:34 p.m. stating that they "have secured your price for payment next Monday—write you fully by post." (In that market, it was customary to make payments by the next Monday.) (7) At 1:46 PM, the seller received the telegram in point (5).
Held that, in contrast to Hyde v. Wrench, the buyer's telegram in (2) was merely a question rather than a counteroffer. As a result, the buyer could still accept the initial offer up until the seller's revocation was made known, which didn't happen until (7). The seller was therefore required to sell to the buyer as his acceptance at point (6) was effective.
The sequence of events was as follows. (1) The plaintiff buyer received an offer from the defendant seller to purchase a quantity of iron for "40s, nett cash, open till Monday." The buyer sent a telegraph to the seller at 9:42 on Monday morning, asking them to confirm if they would accept forty for delivery over a two-month period, or if not, what the longest limit they would allow. (3) The buyer sent a telegraph to the seller, who did not respond. (4) A third party purchased the iron from the merchant. (5) The seller informed the buyer by telegram that he had sold the iron at 1:25 p.m. (6) The buyer and seller sent a telegraph at 1:34 p.m. stating that they "have secured your price for payment next Monday—write you fully by post." (In that market, it was customary to make payments by the next Monday.) (7) At 1:46 PM, the seller received the telegram in point (5).
Held that, in contrast to Hyde v. Wrench, the buyer's telegram in (2) was merely a question rather than a counteroffer. As a result, the buyer could still accept the initial offer up until the seller's revocation was made known, which didn't happen until (7). The seller was therefore required to sell to the buyer as his acceptance at point (6) was effective.
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Brogden and Others v Metropolitan Railway Company (1877) HL
B, the defendants, had been supplying coal to the plaintiffs, M, since the beginning of 1870. On 18 November 1871, B requested a price rise and a new contract. At a meeting on 19 December 1871, M gave to B a draft contract with blank spots for specifics such the date and the name of the arbitrator. B filled in the gaps, made some other modest changes and signed the draft contract. On 21 December, B’s representative returned the contract to M with a note that concluded ‘If you have anything further to communicate letters addressed to “Tondu” will find me’. This arrived M at whose office it was placed in a drawer, used for holding contracts, where it remained Offer and Acceptance 11 until a dispute developed on 7 November 1872. During 1872, B provided coal to M from the date of commencement of the draft contract, 1 January 1872, at the new price as indicated in the draft contract, often up to but never exceeding 350 tons per week, which was the maximum authorized by the draft contract.
Of the several letters which traveled between B and M during the year, Lord Cairns LC commented
: …having read with great care the whole of this correspondence, there appears to me clearly to be pervading the whole of it the expression of a feeling on one side and on the other that those who were ordering the coals were ordering them, and those who were supplying the coals were supplying them, under some course of dealing which created on the one side a right to give the order, and on the other side an obligation to comply with the order.
However, M maintained that, in the lack of acceptance by M of B’s offer, there was no contract.
Held (I) There was a binding contract upon the conditions of the uncompleted draft contained in M’s drawer.
Per Lord Cairns LC: …there having been clearly a consensus between these parties, arrived at and expressed by the document signed by [B], subject only to approbation, on the part of the company, of the additional term…with regard to an arbitrator, that approbation was clearly given when the company commenced a course of dealing which is referable in my mind only to the contract, and when that course of dealing was accepted and acted upon by [B] in the supply of coals.
Per Lord Hatherley, ‘the arrangement was consummated when the first coals… were invoiced at the differing price, and when that differing price was accepted and paid’.
(II) Neither M’s silence in answer to B’s agent’s letter of 21 December 1871 nor any just mental or private acceptance by M would have finalized the contract. Per Lord Blackburn, ‘when you come to the broad proposition…that a simple acceptance in your own mind, without any communication to the other party, and expressed by a mere private act, such as putting a letter into a drawer, completes a contract, I must say I differ from that’.
B, the defendants, had been supplying coal to the plaintiffs, M, since the beginning of 1870. On 18 November 1871, B requested a price rise and a new contract. At a meeting on 19 December 1871, M gave to B a draft contract with blank spots for specifics such the date and the name of the arbitrator. B filled in the gaps, made some other modest changes and signed the draft contract. On 21 December, B’s representative returned the contract to M with a note that concluded ‘If you have anything further to communicate letters addressed to “Tondu” will find me’. This arrived M at whose office it was placed in a drawer, used for holding contracts, where it remained Offer and Acceptance 11 until a dispute developed on 7 November 1872. During 1872, B provided coal to M from the date of commencement of the draft contract, 1 January 1872, at the new price as indicated in the draft contract, often up to but never exceeding 350 tons per week, which was the maximum authorized by the draft contract.
Of the several letters which traveled between B and M during the year, Lord Cairns LC commented
: …having read with great care the whole of this correspondence, there appears to me clearly to be pervading the whole of it the expression of a feeling on one side and on the other that those who were ordering the coals were ordering them, and those who were supplying the coals were supplying them, under some course of dealing which created on the one side a right to give the order, and on the other side an obligation to comply with the order.
However, M maintained that, in the lack of acceptance by M of B’s offer, there was no contract.
Held (I) There was a binding contract upon the conditions of the uncompleted draft contained in M’s drawer.
Per Lord Cairns LC: …there having been clearly a consensus between these parties, arrived at and expressed by the document signed by [B], subject only to approbation, on the part of the company, of the additional term…with regard to an arbitrator, that approbation was clearly given when the company commenced a course of dealing which is referable in my mind only to the contract, and when that course of dealing was accepted and acted upon by [B] in the supply of coals.
Per Lord Hatherley, ‘the arrangement was consummated when the first coals… were invoiced at the differing price, and when that differing price was accepted and paid’.
(II) Neither M’s silence in answer to B’s agent’s letter of 21 December 1871 nor any just mental or private acceptance by M would have finalized the contract. Per Lord Blackburn, ‘when you come to the broad proposition…that a simple acceptance in your own mind, without any communication to the other party, and expressed by a mere private act, such as putting a letter into a drawer, completes a contract, I must say I differ from that’.