Crabb v Arun District Council (1975) CA

This case establishes the principle of proprietary estoppel, a crucial concept in land law. It differs significantly from promissory estoppel.

I. Case Facts:

• Land Ownership: Crabb owned land divided into two parts. Only one had road access.
• Oral Agreement (July 1967): Crabb reached an oral agreement with Arun District Council (ADC) for access to the public road for the second part. No payment was exchanged.
• Council Actions: ADC constructed gaps in their boundary fence for access and then gates at those gaps.
• Crabb's Reliance: Crabb sold the first part of his land without reserving a right of way, relying on the ADC's implied permission for access to the second part.
• Council's Breach: ADC later blocked access to the second part and demanded £3000 for access.

II. Legal Issue:

Did the Council's conduct create a proprietary estoppel preventing them from denying Crabb access?

III. Holding:

The Court of Appeal held in favour of Crabb.

IV. Key Legal Principle: Proprietary Estoppel

This case highlights the doctrine of proprietary estoppel. This differs from promissory estoppel in a crucial way:

• Promissory Estoppel: Operates as a defence to a claim; prevents a party from going back on a promise, usually relating to contractual obligations. It does not create a new cause of action.
• Proprietary Estoppel: Creates a cause of action in itself. It is triggered when:
  1. Representation/Encouragement: One party (B – the Council) leads another (A – Crabb) to believe they have a right over land.
  2. Reliance: A relies on this representation to their detriment (Crabb selling the first part of the land).
  3. Unconscionability: It would be unfair (unconscionable) for B to go back on their implied promise/encouragement.

In Crabb, the Council's actions (creating the access points, failing to object to Crabb's actions) constituted encouragement. Crabb's reliance was evident in his sale of the first portion. The Court deemed it unconscionable for the Council to deny access after their actions.

V. Distinguishing Features from Promissory Estoppel: