LAW

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KembaraXtra-Case Law – Bernstein of Leigh (Baron) v Skyviews & General Ltd [1978] QB 479 (QBD)

Facts:

The claimant, Baron Bernstein, owned a large country estate.

The defendant, Skyviews & General Ltd, operated a business involving aerial photography. An aircraft flew over Bernstein’s land and took an aerial photograph of his country house.

The defendant subsequently contacted Bernstein and offered to sell him a copy of the photograph.

Bernstein objected and claimed that the aircraft had entered the airspace above his land without permission. He brought proceedings, including a claim in trespass to land.

The issue was whether ownership of land gave Bernstein unlimited proprietary rights over all of the airspace extending indefinitely above his property.

Held:

The High Court rejected Bernstein’s claim.

The court held that a landowner does not own or control the airspace above his land to an unlimited height.

The landowner’s rights extend only to such height above the land as is necessary for the ordinary use and enjoyment of the land and the structures upon it.

The aircraft had flown at a height which did not interfere with Bernstein’s ordinary use and enjoyment of his property.

There was therefore no trespass.

Legal Principle – Airspace:

The traditional maxim:

cuius est solum, eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos

suggests that a person who owns land owns everything extending from the heavens above to the depths below.

However, Bernstein v Skyviews demonstrates that the maxim is not applied literally.

A landowner has rights only over the lower stratum of airspace necessary for the ordinary use and enjoyment of the land.

The landowner does not have an unrestricted proprietary right extending indefinitely upwards into the sky.

The Modern Test:

The key question is:

Is the relevant airspace at such a height that interference with it affects the landowner’s ordinary use and enjoyment of the land?

If yes, an intrusion may amount to trespass.

If the aircraft or object is sufficiently high that it does not interfere with the ordinary use and enjoyment of the land, trespass will generally not arise.

Civil Aviation:

The case also recognised the statutory protection given to aircraft flying at a reasonable height.

At the time, this was contained in s 40(1) of the Civil Aviation Act 1949.

The equivalent provision is now found in s 76(1) of the Civil Aviation Act 1982.

Accordingly, merely flying an aircraft over private land at a reasonable height does not, by itself, give the landowner a cause of action in trespass or nuisance.

Exam Principle:

A landowner’s rights in airspace are not unlimited.

Ownership extends only so far upwards as is reasonably necessary for the ordinary use and enjoyment of the land.

Therefore:

  • intrusion into lower airspace may constitute trespass;
  • use of higher airspace will generally not constitute trespass where it does not interfere with the landowner’s ordinary use and enjoyment.

Link to Overhanging Branches – Lemmon v Webb [1895]:

The lower airspace above land remains protected.

Where branches from a neighbour’s tree overhang the boundary, the landowner may ordinarily cut them back to the boundary, subject to the relevant rules governing abatement.

This illustrates that physical intrusion into the immediately usable airspace above land may interfere with the landowner’s proprietary rights.

Link to Crane Jibs – Woollerton & Wilson Ltd v Richard Costain Ltd [1970]:

The principle is also illustrated by a crane jib swinging through the airspace above neighbouring land.

Such an intrusion may constitute trespass because the relevant airspace is sufficiently close to the land to fall within the landowner’s protected lower airspace.

Therefore:

Bernstein → high-altitude flight: generally no trespass.

Woollerton → crane jib entering lower airspace: trespass.

Ad Inferos – Rights Below the Land:

The maxim also refers to ownership extending downwards:

ad inferos – “to the depths of the earth.”

A landowner generally has proprietary rights in the soil and substances beneath the surface.

However, there are important statutory and common-law exceptions.

For example:

  • gold and silver may belong to the Crown under the principles associated with the Case of Mines (1568);
  • coal is subject to the statutory regime under the Coal Industry Act 1994;
  • petroleum and natural gas are vested in the Crown under the Petroleum Act 1998.

Therefore, ownership of land does not necessarily mean ownership of every valuable substance beneath it.

Treasure:

Objects discovered beneath land may also be governed by special rules.

Under the Treasure Act 1996, qualifying treasure does not simply belong to the landowner or finder.

Where an object satisfies the statutory definition of treasure, ownership may vest in the Crown, subject to the statutory rules and existing interests.

The 1996 Act replaced much of the older common-law doctrine of treasure trove, which had depended heavily upon whether valuable objects containing substantial quantities of gold or silver had been deliberately hidden with an intention to recover them.

Overall Land-Law Principle:

Ownership of land gives the owner substantial rights:

  • upwards into the airspace necessary for ordinary use and enjoyment;
  • downwards into the subsoil;

but neither right is absolute.

Both are subject to common-law limitations and statutory exceptions.

In one line:

Bernstein v Skyviews = a landowner does not own the sky indefinitely; proprietary rights in airspace extend only to the height reasonably necessary for the ordinary use and enjoyment of the land.



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