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KembaraXtra-Case Law-C v S (1988)
Core Issue:
Interpretation of "capable of being born alive" under the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929.
Specifically, whether a fetus of 18-21 weeks gestation is protected by the Act.
Facts of the Case:
Plaintiff (father) sought an injunction to prevent the mother from aborting their 18-21 week fetus.
Argument for injunction: The fetus was "capable of being born alive" and thus protected by the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929.
Court Decision:
Court of Appeal refused to grant the injunction.
Reasoning (Sir John Donaldson MR):
If the fetus has reached a stage where it is incapable of breathing ever, then it is not "a child capable of being born alive" under the Act.
Essentially, the capacity to breathe independently is a key factor.
Key Takeaway:
"Capable of being born alive": At the time, the definition hinged on the fetus's ability to breathe independently of the mother.
Capacity to breathe (even with assistance) is crucial
Related Cases/Further Points:
Rance v Mid-Downs HA (1991): Important for understanding the continuing evolution of this area of law.
Clarifies that the ability to breathe with assistance (e.g., a ventilator) still qualifies as "capable of being born alive".
This means that even if a fetus requires medical intervention to breathe after birth, it can still be considered "capable of being born alive".
Core Issue:
Interpretation of "capable of being born alive" under the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929.
Specifically, whether a fetus of 18-21 weeks gestation is protected by the Act.
Facts of the Case:
Plaintiff (father) sought an injunction to prevent the mother from aborting their 18-21 week fetus.
Argument for injunction: The fetus was "capable of being born alive" and thus protected by the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929.
Court Decision:
Court of Appeal refused to grant the injunction.
Reasoning (Sir John Donaldson MR):
If the fetus has reached a stage where it is incapable of breathing ever, then it is not "a child capable of being born alive" under the Act.
Essentially, the capacity to breathe independently is a key factor.
Key Takeaway:
"Capable of being born alive": At the time, the definition hinged on the fetus's ability to breathe independently of the mother.
Capacity to breathe (even with assistance) is crucial
Related Cases/Further Points:
Rance v Mid-Downs HA (1991): Important for understanding the continuing evolution of this area of law.
Clarifies that the ability to breathe with assistance (e.g., a ventilator) still qualifies as "capable of being born alive".
This means that even if a fetus requires medical intervention to breathe after birth, it can still be considered "capable of being born alive".
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