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Kembaraxtra-Case Law-Doughty (1986) - Provocation & Infanticide
Case Overview:
Case Overview:
- Citation: Doughty (1986)
- Court: CA (Court of Appeal)
- The defendant (D) killed his 17-day-old son.
- D's Defense: Provocation stemming from the baby's persistent crying and restlessness.
- Whether the trial judge erred in not allowing the jury to consider the defense of provocation.
- Specifically, the application of the "objective test" within the context of provocation.
- D was found guilty of manslaughter, not murder.
- The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did err in refusing to allow the jury to consider the defense of provocation.
- The Homicide Act 1957 mandates that the trial judge must allow the jury to consider the objective test.
- The "objective test" is the second part of the test for provocation.
- The judge is not the one that determines if provocation exists; the jury must determine if the provocation was enough to make a reasonable person act like the defendant.
- Clarifies the judge's role in directing the jury on the defense of provocation under the Homicide Act 1957.
- Emphasizes the importance of the objective test in assessing provocation claims.
- Connects extreme distress or loss of control caused by an infant's behavior to the potential for a manslaughter verdict (as opposed to murder).
- Homicide Act 1957, s 3
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