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KembaraXtra-Case Law – DPP v K (A Minor) [1990] 1 WLR 1067 (QBD)
Facts:
D was a 15-year-old schoolboy attending a chemistry lesson.
During the lesson, the pupils were working with concentrated sulphuric acid and had been warned about its dangers.
D obtained permission to leave the classroom to wash acid from his hand. Without his teacher’s knowledge, however, he took a tube containing concentrated sulphuric acid with him into the school lavatory.
While there, D experimented with the acid by pouring some of it onto toilet paper.
He then heard someone approaching. Fearing that he would be discovered with the acid, D panicked and poured the remaining acid into the upturned nozzle of a hot-air hand dryer.
When the footsteps disappeared, D returned to his chemistry lesson. He intended to return later and wash the acid out of the dryer.
Before D could do so, however, another pupil entered the lavatory and switched on the hand dryer.
The machine expelled the sulphuric acid onto the pupil’s face, causing serious injury and permanent scarring.
D was charged with offences under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, including assault occasioning actual bodily harm under s 47.
The magistrates acquitted D, and the prosecution appealed by way of case stated.
Held:
The Divisional Court held that D’s conduct was capable of amounting to an assault or battery occasioning actual bodily harm.
The fact that D had not personally switched on the dryer and had not directly applied the acid to V was not decisive.
The application of force could be indirect.
Parker LJ explained in substance that a person who places a dangerous substance inside a machine can assault the next person who uses that machine just as effectively as if D had personally operated the machine.
The court therefore treated the situation as analogous to laying a trap for another person.
Recklessness:
The court also considered whether D possessed the necessary mens rea.
At the time, the court applied the objective approach to recklessness developed in R v Caldwell.
Under the Caldwell approach, D could be reckless if:
- his conduct created an obvious risk of harm; and
- D either:
- recognised the risk and nevertheless took it; or
- failed to consider an obvious risk at all.
The court considered that the Caldwell concept of recklessness could apply to an offence against the person.
On the facts, D had created a dangerous situation by leaving concentrated acid inside a hand dryer that another pupil might use before he returned.
His conduct was therefore capable of satisfying the recklessness requirement under the approach then being applied.
Legal Principle 1 – Indirect Battery:
A battery does not require D personally to touch V.
Force may be applied indirectly.
Therefore, placing a dangerous substance inside a machine which subsequently causes physical injury when V operates it can constitute the application of unlawful force.
This aspect of DPP v K remains important authority for indirect battery.
Legal Principle 2 – Recklessness:
At the time of the decision, the court held that Caldwell-style objective recklessness could apply to offences against the person.
Thus, D could potentially be reckless even if he had not actually foreseen the risk, provided that the risk was objectively obvious.
Exam Principle:
DPP v K is important for two separate propositions, and they should not be confused:
- Actus reus: Battery may be committed through the indirect application of force.
- Mens rea: The court applied Caldwell objective recklessness to an offence against the person.
However, the second proposition concerning Caldwell recklessness was soon rejected by later authority.
Link to Caldwell:
DPP v K attempted to extend R v Caldwell beyond criminal damage and into offences against the person.
The reasoning was that a defendant could be reckless where an obvious risk existed even though D had failed to think about that risk.
Important Development – R v Spratt:
The recklessness aspect of DPP v K did not remain good law.
In R v Spratt [1990] 1 WLR 1073 (CA), the Court of Appeal rejected the use of Caldwell recklessness for offences against the person.
Spratt established that the appropriate form of recklessness was subjective Cunningham recklessness.
Therefore, D must actually foresee the relevant risk and nevertheless go on to take it.
Further Development – Savage and Parmenter:
The subjective approach was subsequently confirmed in R v Savage; DPP v Parmenter [1992] 1 AC 699 (HL).
For assault or battery, recklessness requires the defendant personally to foresee the risk that unlawful force may be applied and nevertheless take that risk.
For s 47 ABH, however, D does not additionally need to intend or foresee the actual bodily harm itself. It is sufficient that D has the mens rea required for the underlying assault or battery and that the assault or battery causes ABH.
Current Significance:
The case must therefore be divided into two parts:
- Indirect force principle → still important/good law.
- Caldwell recklessness for offences against the person → no longer good law.
The modern approach is subjective recklessness, based on Cunningham and confirmed by later cases.
In one line:
DPP v K = putting acid in a hand dryer could constitute an indirect battery; although K applied Caldwell objective recklessness to offences against the person, that part of the decision was later rejected in Spratt in favour of subjective Cunningham recklessness.
The distinction is particularly important for exams: cite DPP v K for indirect battery, but do not rely on it as the modern test for recklessness in offences against the person. Spratt and Savage/Parmenter establish the subjective approach.