- Published on
KembaraXtra-Case Law-R v Richardson (1998)
Key Principle: The doctrine of "informed consent" as understood in civil law, does not apply in criminal law, specifically in the context of battery/assault.
Facts:[Note: You need to consult your original document for the specific facts]
Decision: Note: You need to consult your original document for the specific decision]
Reasoning (as articulated by Otton LJ):
Key Principle: The doctrine of "informed consent" as understood in civil law, does not apply in criminal law, specifically in the context of battery/assault.
Facts:[Note: You need to consult your original document for the specific facts]
Decision: Note: You need to consult your original document for the specific decision]
Reasoning (as articulated by Otton LJ):
- Foundation of Battery Law: "The general proposition which underlies this area of the law [of battery] is that the human body is inviolate..."
- This highlights the fundamental principle that any unwanted physical contact constitutes battery.
- Consent as an Exception: "...but there are circumstances which the law recognises where consent may operate to prevent conduct which would otherwise be classified as an assault from being so treated."
- Consent is a key defense against a charge of battery. If the person touched consented to the touching, it is not battery.
- Surgical Interference: "Reasonable surgical interference is clearly such an exception."
- Acknowledges that surgical procedures, which inherently involve physical contact, are lawful due to implied or express consent.
- Distinction between Criminal and Civil Law: "It was suggested in argument that we might be assisted by the civil law of consent, where such expressions as ‘real’ or ‘informed’ consent prevail. In this regard, the criminal and civil law do not run along the same track. The concept of informed consent has no place in the criminal law."
- This is the core holding of the case. The court explicitly rejects applying the civil law standard of "informed consent" (which requires disclosure of risks and alternatives) to criminal battery cases.
- No Duty to Inform: "It would also be a mistake, in our view, to introduce the concept of a duty to communicate information to a patient about the risk of an activity before consent to an act can be treated as valid."
- The court further clarifies that there is no criminal law duty to inform a person of the risks associated with an activity for consent to be valid in the context of battery.
- Understand the difference between consent in criminal law (battery/assault) versus civil law (negligence/medical malpractice).
- In criminal law, the focus is on whether consent was actually given, not necessarily whether it was "informed."
- This case does not eliminate the need for consent in medical or other contexts where physical contact occurs. It simply clarifies that the level of information required for valid consent differs between criminal and civil contexts.
- Consider the potential policy reasons behind this distinction. Is it to avoid unduly burdening medical professionals with criminal liability for failing to perfectly inform patients of every possible risk?
- Consider how this case relates to other legal principles regarding consent, such as fraud, duress, or incapacity.
0 Comments