LAW

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KembaraXtra-Case Law – R v Satnam and Kewal [1983] EWCA Crim 5; (1984) 78 Cr App R 149 (CA)

Facts:

The defendants, Satnam and Kewal, were aged 31 and 30 respectively.

The victim was a 13-year-old girl who worked part-time in the same shop as Satnam. She had met Kewal only once before.

One evening, Satnam offered the girl a lift in Kewal’s car to the shop so that she could do some cleaning. When they arrived, there were no lights at the shop, so she agreed to drive around with them for a while, having told them that she needed to be home by 9.00 pm.

During the journey, there were two incidents in which the defendants had, or attempted to have, sexual intercourse with her. In each incident, one defendant went into the back of the car with the girl while the other continued driving.

The girl kicked, struggled and repeatedly told them to leave her alone, but the defendants removed her underwear and persisted.

Both defendants were convicted of rape on the basis that they had been reckless as to whether the girl consented, and of aiding and abetting each other. They appealed against their convictions.

Held:

The Court of Appeal held that the meaning of recklessness in rape was different from the Caldwell concept of recklessness used in criminal damage.

The trial judge had directed the jury in terms suggesting that D could be reckless where the girl’s lack of consent would have been obvious to an ordinary observer, even though D himself had not considered the possibility.

That approach was incorrect for rape.

Bristow J explained that:

“The word ‘reckless’ in relation to rape involves a different concept to its use in relation to malicious damage.”

The appropriate approach was the subjective concept identified in R v Kimber.

A defendant was reckless as to consent where his attitude towards the woman’s wishes amounted to indifference — essentially, where his state of mind was:

“couldn’t care less.”

The rape convictions were therefore unsafe because the jury had been directed using an objective approach to recklessness rather than the correct approach to recklessness as to consent.

Legal Principle:

Recklessness did not have the same meaning for every criminal offence.

In the context of rape under the former law, recklessness as to consent concerned D’s state of mind towards V’s consent.

D could be reckless where he was indifferent to whether V consented — where he effectively “couldn’t care less” whether she consented or not.

Exam Principle:

For rape under the law at that time, the prosecution had to prove that D either:

  1. knew that V was not consenting; or
  2. was reckless as to whether V consented, meaning that D was indifferent to V’s feelings and wishes.

The Caldwell objective test should not simply be applied to determine recklessness as to consent.

Link to Kimber:

Satnam and Kewal approved the approach in R v Kimber: indifference to the victim’s wishes — a “couldn’t care less” attitude — amounted to recklessness as to consent.

Link to Caldwell:

The case is important because it showed that Caldwell did not provide a universal definition of recklessness throughout criminal law.

Recklessness in rape was concerned with D’s attitude to the victim’s consent, rather than merely asking whether a risk of non-consent would have been obvious to a reasonable person.

Important Development:

This case concerns the former law of rape.

Under the modern Sexual Offences Act 2003, the prosecution must establish that V did not consent and that D did not reasonably believe that V consented.

In one line:

Satnam and Kewal = recklessness as to consent meant a subjective “couldn’t care less” attitude towards V’s wishes, rather than Caldwell-style objective recklessness.



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