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KembaraXtra-Case Law – R v Spratt [1990] 1 WLR 1073 (CA)
Facts:
D fired an air pistol from the window of his flat, aiming at a sign outside.
At the time, a seven-year-old girl was playing in the area below.
Two pellets fired by D struck the girl and caused her injury.
D was charged under s 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 with assault occasioning actual bodily harm.
The issue was whether D could be regarded as reckless even if he had not actually foreseen the possibility that someone might be injured.
Held:
The Court of Appeal held that, for offences against the person, the appropriate test of recklessness was the subjective Cunningham test.
Therefore, the prosecution had to prove that D actually foresaw the risk that his conduct might result in unlawful force being applied to another person and nevertheless went on to take that risk.
It was not sufficient merely to show that a reasonable person would have appreciated the danger.
The objective Caldwell test, under which D could be reckless merely because he failed to consider an obvious risk, was not appropriate for offences against the person.
Legal Principle:
For offences against the person, recklessness requires subjective foresight of risk.
D must:
- actually foresee the relevant risk; and
- nevertheless go on to take that risk.
Therefore, a defendant who genuinely does not foresee the risk cannot be reckless merely because the risk would have been obvious to a reasonable person.
Exam Principle:
When dealing with recklessness in offences against the person, apply Cunningham subjective recklessness, not Caldwell objective recklessness.
The question is:
Did this defendant actually foresee the risk of unlawful force or injury and nevertheless take that risk?
If D did not actually foresee the risk, recklessness is not established.
Link to Cunningham:
Spratt confirmed that Cunningham recklessness was the appropriate approach for offences against the person.
Under Cunningham, recklessness depends on D’s actual state of mind, rather than what an ordinary reasonable person would have foreseen.
Link to DPP v K:
Spratt rejected the suggestion in DPP v K (A Minor) that Caldwell objective recklessness could generally apply to offences against the person.
Therefore:
- DPP v K remains important for the principle of indirect battery;
- but its application of Caldwell recklessness to offences against the person was not followed.
Link to Caldwell:
Caldwell allowed liability where D either:
- recognised an obvious risk and took it; or
- failed to think about an obvious risk altogether.
Spratt held that this objective approach was too wide for offences against the person.
Actual subjective foresight was required.
Further Development – Savage and Parmenter:
The subjective approach was subsequently confirmed by the House of Lords in R v Savage; DPP v Parmenter [1992] 1 AC 699.
Those cases confirmed that the mens rea for assault and battery is intention or subjective recklessness as to the application of unlawful force.
For an offence under s 47 OAPA 1861, D does not additionally need to intend or foresee the actual bodily harm. It is enough that D has the mens rea for the underlying assault or battery and that ABH results.
In one line:
Spratt = recklessness for offences against the person is subjective: D must actually foresee the risk and nevertheless go on to take it.