LAW

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KembaraXtra-Case Law – Taylor v Hamer [2002] EWCA Civ 1130; [2003] 1 EGLR 103 (CA)

Facts:

Taylor agreed to purchase the Eastington Hall Estate from Hamer.

Part of the estate consisted of a landscaped area known as the “dog garden”, which was paved with a substantial quantity of old and valuable flagstones.

Taylor inspected the property on several occasions before exchange of contracts and saw the dog garden with the flagstones in place. The sales particulars described the property as including “landscaped gardens.”

After Taylor had agreed in principle to purchase the property, but before contracts were exchanged, Hamer’s husband instructed that approximately 282 square yards of flagstones be removed from the dog garden.

The flagstones were stacked in a field outside the curtilage and the area from which they had been removed was covered with grass.

The trial judge found that this had been done in order to disguise the fact that the flagstones had been removed.

Before exchange of contracts, a representative of Taylor’s solicitors noticed the pile of flagstones and asked whether they had been removed from the property.

Hamer’s side replied that they had not been removed from the property and that they were not included in the sale.

That statement was false, and the trial judge later found that it had been made fraudulently.

Contracts were finally exchanged on 29 May 1997.

Taylor subsequently discovered the truth and claimed that the original flagstones should be restored.

Decision at First Instance:

The trial judge held that Taylor could not succeed in contract because the relevant contractual conditions provided that:

  • the buyer was deemed to have inspected the property; and
  • the buyer accepted the property in its physical state at the date of the contract.

Since the flagstones had already been removed by the time contracts were exchanged, the judge considered that they were not part of the property being sold.

However, Hamer was held liable in the tort of deceit because of the fraudulent statements concerning the flagstones.

Taylor was awarded the cost of replacement flagstones, but not the cost of restoring and relaying the original stones.

Taylor appealed.

Held:

The Court of Appeal, by a majority, allowed Taylor’s appeal.

The majority held that the flagstones formed part of the land which Taylor had reasonably understood he was purchasing.

The fact that the stones had been physically removed shortly before exchange did not allow Hamer to escape liability where their removal had been deliberately concealed and a false answer had been given when Taylor’s solicitor specifically asked about them.

The flagstones should therefore be treated as included within the contractual sale.

Taylor was entitled to the return of the original flagstones and the cost of relaying them.

Legal Principle – Time for Assessing the Property:

As a general rule, the property which passes under a contract for sale is assessed according to its state at the date of exchange of contracts.

This reflects the normal principle that the purchaser agrees to take the property in the physical state in which it exists when the contract is made.

However, Taylor v Hamer establishes an important qualification.

A seller cannot deliberately remove part of the property before exchange, conceal what has been done, and then rely on the contractual date or the doctrine of caveat emptor to defeat the buyer’s claim.

Legal Principle – Deliberate Concealment:

The doctrine of caveat emptor — “let the buyer beware” — does not protect a seller who has engaged in deliberate or fraudulent concealment.

The contractual provisions deeming the buyer to have inspected the property could not be interpreted as requiring Taylor to discover alterations which the seller had intentionally concealed.

The law would not permit the seller to benefit from her own fraudulent conduct.

Why the Flagstones Were Part of the Land:

The flagstones were not merely loose paving slabs stored on the property.

Before their removal, they had been laid as part of the landscaped dog garden.

They therefore formed part of the land which Taylor had inspected and reasonably understood he was agreeing to purchase.

If the seller wished to exclude them from the transaction, they should have been expressly excluded from the sale rather than secretly removed.

The Majority Approach:

The majority placed considerable importance on Taylor’s reasonable understanding of what he was buying.

He had inspected an estate which included a paved landscaped garden.

The seller then secretly altered that property before exchange.

The contractual documents were therefore interpreted against the background of the property which had been presented to the purchaser.

The majority’s approach can be summarised as:

a seller should not be able secretly to remove fixtures and then rely on the altered state of the property to defeat the purchaser’s reasonable expectations.

Arden LJ’s Dissent:

Arden LJ disagreed with the majority.

Her view placed greater emphasis on orthodox contractual principle.

She considered that the contract should generally be interpreted by reference to the state of the property at the date of exchange.

Since the flagstones had physically been removed before exchange, she considered that they were not part of the property at that date.

This dissent illustrates the tension between:

  • strict contractual certainty at the date of exchange; and
  • protecting purchasers against deliberate concealment by vendors.

Exam Principle:

The normal starting point is:

the physical state of the property is assessed at the date of exchange of contracts.

However:

a vendor cannot rely on that rule where fixtures or parts of the property have been deliberately removed and the removal has been fraudulently concealed from the purchaser.

Therefore, always ask:

  1. Was the item a fixture or part of the land before its removal?
  2. Was it removed before or after exchange?
  3. Was the purchaser aware of the removal?
  4. Did the vendor deliberately conceal the removal?
  5. Was the item expressly excluded from the sale?

Link to the Fixtures Cases:

Taylor v Hamer differs slightly from cases such as Holland v Hodgson, Leigh v Taylor, and Berkley v Poulett.

Those cases primarily ask:

Is the item a fixture or a chattel?

Taylor v Hamer asks an additional question:

At what point should the court assess what formed part of the land being sold, especially where the seller has removed fixtures before exchange?

The flagstones were treated as part of the landscaped land and should have passed with the property unless expressly excluded.

Link to Phillips v Lamdin:

The Court of Appeal referred to Phillips v Lamdin [1949] 2 KB 33, where a fixture was improperly removed in connection with a sale and the court ordered restoration.

Taylor similarly demonstrates that a purchaser may obtain a remedy requiring the restoration of property which should have passed with the land.

Practical Conveyancing Significance:

The case emphasises the importance of clearly identifying which fixtures and fittings are included or excluded from a sale.

If a seller wishes to retain something which objectively appears to form part of the property, the safest approach is to expressly exclude it in the contract or fixtures-and-fittings documentation.

Secret removal is very different from an express contractual exclusion.

Fixtures Timeline:

Holland v Hodgson → degree and purpose of annexation determine whether an object is a fixture.

Leigh v Taylor → attachment for better enjoyment of the object itself → chattel.

Re Whaley → item forming part of an integrated decorative scheme → fixture.

Berkley v Poulett → decorative objects may remain chattels despite physical attachment.

Elitestone v Morris → substantial structure removable only by demolition → part of the realty.

Taylor v Hamer → fixture/land normally considered at exchange, but deliberate and fraudulent concealment prevents the vendor relying on the altered state of the property.

In one line:

Taylor v Hamer = although the property is normally assessed in its physical state at exchange of contracts, a seller cannot secretly remove and fraudulently conceal fixtures and then rely on that removal to defeat the buyer’s contractual entitlement.



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