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Malaysian Banking Law — Banker’s Duty of Care in Investment Transactions: Lee Cheong Chee v HSBC Bank Malaysia Bhd [2021] MLJU 574 (HC)
Case Scenario
Daniel is a businessman in Kuala Lumpur. He receives online advertisements from several foreign investment platforms promising extremely high profits through forex and cryptocurrency trading. Believing the representations made by the companies, Daniel uses two credit cards issued by HSBC Bank Malaysia Berhad to transfer more than RM1 million to these foreign brokerage companies over a period of several months.
Daniel personally authorises every transaction and continues making payments because he expects substantial investment returns. Eventually, the investment platforms disappear, Daniel loses all his money, and he is unable to contact the companies or recover the investments.
Daniel then sues the bank, arguing that:
  • the bank should have warned him about suspicious transactions;
  • the bank should have investigated the foreign companies;
  • the bank should have checked with Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) or the Securities Commission (SC) to determine whether the companies were licensed;
  • the bank should have suspended or blocked the transactions.
The bank argues that:
  • it merely followed Daniel’s own instructions;
  • the relationship between the bank and Daniel was contractual;
  • the bank was not Daniel’s investment adviser;
  • the actual fraud was committed by the foreign merchants, not the bank.
This scenario reflects the legal issues decided in:
Lee Cheong Chee v HSBC Bank Malaysia Bhd


Introduction
This case is highly significant in Malaysian banking law because it clarifies:
  • the scope of a bank’s duty of care;
  • the limits of bank liability in customer-authorised investment scams;
  • the distinction between contractual banking relationships and fiduciary advisory relationships;
  • the application and limits of the English Quincecare principle in Malaysia.
The High Court confirmed an important principle:
A bank does not generally owe a duty to protect customers from poor or fraudulent investment decisions independently made by the customers themselves.
The court further held that:
the ordinary banker–customer relationship is contractual rather than fiduciary.


Facts of the Case
The customer held two credit cards issued by the bank and entered into Cardholder Agreements with the bank.
Over approximately ten months:
  • the customer used the credit cards to make payments exceeding RM1 million;
  • payments were made to four foreign brokerage companies;
  • the customer relied on promises of high investment returns made by those companies.
The customer personally authorised all the transactions and repaid the bank for all the credit card usage.
However:
  • the customer never received the promised profits;
  • the brokerage accounts became inaccessible;
  • the investment companies were allegedly fraudulent.
The customer then sued the bank for negligence.


Customer’s Arguments
The customer alleged that the bank owed him a duty of care to:
(1) Warn him about suspicious transactions
The customer argued that the bank should have informed him that the transactions appeared risky or suspicious.


(2) Conduct due diligence
The customer claimed the bank should have investigated the foreign brokerage companies and the accounts used by them.


(3) Suspend the transactions
The customer argued that the bank should have stopped or delayed the payments whenever suspicious circumstances arose.


(4) Check with BNM or the Securities Commission
The customer claimed the bank should have determined whether the foreign companies were licensed financial institutions.


The Quincecare Duty Argument
The customer relied on the English case:
Barclays Bank plc v Quincecare Ltd
This case established what is commonly known as the:
“Quincecare duty”
Under this principle:
a bank may owe a duty not to execute payment instructions if the bank has reasonable grounds to suspect fraud or misappropriation.
The customer attempted to extend this principle to his situation.


Bank’s Arguments
The bank argued that:
  • all transactions were personally authorised by the customer;
  • the bank merely executed the customer’s instructions;
  • the relationship was contractual only;
  • the bank was not acting as an investment adviser;
  • the fraud was committed by the foreign merchants, not by the bank.
The bank also relied heavily on the express contractual terms contained in the Cardholder Agreements.


Important Contractual Terms
The banking contract provided that:
Customer must verify statements
The customer had to examine statements and notify the bank within 60 days regarding any irregularities.


Disputes with merchants are customer’s responsibility
The customer agreed that disputes involving merchants must be resolved directly with the merchants.


Obligation to repay remains
Even if disputes existed with merchants:
  • the customer still had to repay the bank.


Bank excluded from liability
The agreement excluded liability for losses caused by matters outside the bank’s control.


Issues Before the Court
The court considered several major legal issues:
(1) Whether the bank owed a tortious duty of care to protect the customer from investment scams.
(2) Whether the bank had a duty to investigate suspicious investment transactions.
(3) Whether the Quincecare duty applied in Malaysia under these circumstances.
(4) Whether the banker–customer relationship was contractual or fiduciary in nature.


Held by the High Court
The High Court struck out the customer’s claim and ruled in favour of the bank.
The court held that:
✔ the relationship between bank and customer was contractual;
✔ no fiduciary duty arose;
✔ the bank owed no duty to advise on investments;
✔ the bank was not required to investigate customer-authorised transactions.


Judicial Reasoning
1. Banker–Customer Relationship Is Contractual
The court reaffirmed the traditional banking principle:
ordinary banker–customer relationships are contractual rather than fiduciary.
The bank’s role was:
  • to provide banking facilities;
  • to execute customer instructions;
  • to process authorised transactions.
The bank was NOT:
  • the customer’s investment adviser;
  • financial consultant;
  • guarantor against bad investments.


2. No General Duty to Advise on Investments
The court clearly stated:
banks do not generally owe customers a duty to warn them about risky investments.
The customer independently chose:
  • the investment companies;
  • the transactions;
  • the payment instructions.
The bank was not consulted for financial advice.
Therefore:
✔ no advisory duty arose.


3. No Duty to Investigate Every Transaction
The court rejected the argument that banks must:
  • investigate every investment;
  • verify every merchant;
  • determine licensing status;
  • assess investment legality.
The court explained that imposing such obligations would:
  • severely burden banking operations;
  • disrupt commercial transactions;
  • make banking impractical.


4. Distinction Between Financing Bank and Advisory Bank
The court distinguished between:
Ordinary commercial banks
These banks:
  • provide payment services;
  • extend credit facilities;
  • process instructions.
Their relationship with customers is generally contractual.


Advisory or investment banks
These institutions:
  • provide investment advice;
  • manage investments;
  • assume advisory responsibilities.
In such situations:
✔ fiduciary obligations may arise.


Important Judicial Statement
The judge stated:
“It would be incredibly unfair if the Defendant is made to pay for the sums the Plaintiff had paid the Merchants when the Defendant is not privy to the Transactions.”
This means:
  • the bank did not participate in the fraud;
  • the bank did not recommend the investments;
  • the bank was not involved in the customer’s investment decisions.
Therefore:
✔ liability should remain with the fraudsters, not the bank.


Relationship with Other Malaysian Cases
Connection with Chang Yun Tai v HSBC Bank
Chang Yun Tai v HSBC Bank (M) Bhd
The Federal Court similarly held that:
customers themselves are responsible for ensuring the validity of their own transactions.
The bank is not expected to investigate every agreement entered into by customers.


Connection with Redmond v Allied Irish Banks
Redmond v Allied Irish Banks Plc
The court referred approvingly to the statement:
“I can see no basis for a duty to advise or warn a customer that there are risks attendant upon something which the customer wishes to do.”
This reinforces the principle that:
✔ customers bear responsibility for their own commercial decisions.


Critical Analysis
Why the Court Refused to Impose Liability
The court adopted a commercially practical approach.
If banks were legally required to:
  • investigate every transaction;
  • assess investment risks;
  • verify merchant legitimacy;
  • suspend suspicious payments;
then:
  • banking transactions would slow dramatically;
  • commercial efficiency would suffer;
  • operational costs would increase enormously;
  • banks would become insurers against all financial scams.
The court recognised that:
modern banking depends on rapid processing of customer instructions.
Therefore:
✔ responsibility for independent investment decisions remains primarily with customers.


Strengths of the Decision
The decision promotes:
  • commercial certainty;
  • banking efficiency;
  • operational practicality;
  • contractual freedom.
It also prevents banks from becoming automatically liable whenever customers lose money in speculative investments.


Possible Criticisms
Some may argue that:
  • banks possess sophisticated fraud-detection systems;
  • banks may sometimes identify suspicious transaction patterns earlier than customers;
  • modern online scams may justify stronger consumer protection obligations.
However, the court prioritised:
✔ commercial practicality;
✔ certainty in banking operations.


Practical Application
This case is extremely relevant in modern banking practice, especially involving:
  • online scams;
  • cryptocurrency fraud;
  • unauthorised investment schemes;
  • foreign trading platforms;
  • internet banking fraud.
The case establishes that:
banks are generally not liable merely because a customer voluntarily transferred money to fraudsters.


Practical Legal Principle
A bank may become liable only if:
  • it acts dishonestly;
  • it ignores clear evidence of fraud;
  • it assumes an advisory role;
  • it breaches express contractual obligations;
  • it negligently executes customer instructions.
However:
✔ where the customer independently authorises the transactions, liability usually remains with the customer.


Solution to the Case Scenario
Applying the principles from:
Lee Cheong Chee v HSBC Bank Malaysia Bhd
Daniel would likely fail in his claim against the bank because:
  • he voluntarily authorised all transactions;
  • the bank merely followed instructions;
  • the bank was not his financial adviser;
  • no fiduciary relationship existed;
  • the fraud was committed by the investment companies.
Therefore:
✔ the bank would likely not be liable.


Possible Different Outcome
The result may differ if:
  • the bank recommended the investments;
  • the bank acted as Daniel’s investment adviser;
  • the bank knew of the fraud but ignored it;
  • the bank dishonestly facilitated the scam.
In such cases:
✔ fiduciary duties or enhanced duties of care may arise.


Final Legal Principle
The ordinary banker–customer relationship is contractual rather than fiduciary. A bank generally owes a duty to execute customer instructions carefully, but it does not owe a general duty to protect customers from poor investment decisions or independently authorised fraudulent transactions unless the bank assumes an advisory or fiduciary role.

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