Malaysian Property Law

Judicial Review of Discretionary Land Acquisition Powers

1. Case Study

Case Study: Challenging a State Acquisition Decision on Administrative-Law Grounds

Background

Maju Finance Development Sdn Bhd owns several parcels of land in Penang.

The State Authority decides to acquire the lands under section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act 1960.

A preliminary notification is issued under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act 1960, followed by the relevant acquisition process under the Act.

The company objects to the acquisition.

However, it understands that merely disagreeing with the State Authority’s decision is not sufficient.

The courts do not ordinarily reconsider a discretionary administrative decision simply because the court believes that:

• the decision was unwise;
• another decision would have been preferable;
• the authority made a poor policy choice; or
• the court itself would have reached a different conclusion.

Instead, judicial review focuses upon the legality of the exercise of discretionary power.

The Company’s Concerns

Maju Finance Development argues that the acquisition should be judicially reviewed.

It alleges that the State Authority may have exercised its discretion unlawfully because the purpose stated in the acquisition notification is vague.

The company further argues that governmental acquisition powers under section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 are discretionary powers and therefore remain subject to established administrative-law principles.

According to the company, a decision to acquire land could potentially be challenged if it involved:

• procedural ultra vires;
• mala fides;
• improper motives;
• unreasonableness;
• failure to consider relevant matters;
• reliance upon irrelevant considerations;
• fettering of discretion;
• acting under dictation; or
• another recognised abuse of administrative discretion.

Position of the State Authority

The State Authority argues that the decision to acquire land involves substantial governmental discretion.

It maintains that the courts should not interfere merely because the landowner disagrees with the acquisition.

The State Authority further relies upon section 8(3) of the Land Acquisition Act 1960, under which the declaration made under section 8 carries strong conclusive effect regarding the need for the scheduled land for the stated purpose.

The Judicial Review Question

The central question therefore becomes whether section 8(3) completely prevents judicial review.

The better distinction is between:

reviewing the merits of the acquisition, and

reviewing the legality of the exercise of the acquisition power.

Section 8(3) gives substantial finality to the declaration concerning the need for the land.

However, it does not necessarily prevent a court from examining whether the statutory power exercised through a section 4 or section 8(1) notification was affected by recognised administrative-law defects.

Relevant Malaysian Illustration:

Yew Lean Finance Development (M) Sdn Bhd v Director of Lands & Mines, Penang

This issue is illustrated by Yew Lean Finance Development (M) Sdn Bhd v Director of Lands & Mines, Penang.

In that case, a notification issued by the State Government under the Land Acquisition Act 1960 was challenged.

The landowner argued that the lands were being acquired for a vague purpose.

Accordingly, it contended that the acquisition notice was null and void.

The case demonstrates an important point: although challenging an acquisition may be difficult in practice, a landowner may attempt to invoke recognised administrative-law grounds when questioning the legality of the State Authority’s exercise of statutory discretion.

The Central Conflict

The case raises a fundamental question:

To what extent may the courts review the State Authority’s discretionary decision to acquire land under section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 without improperly reconsidering the merits of the acquisition itself?

2. Questions and Answers with Case Examples

Question 1: Do courts review discretionary land acquisition decisions on their merits?

Answer

Generally, no.

Judicial review does not ordinarily allow a court to replace the administrative authority’s decision with its own preferred decision.

The court does not interfere merely because it believes the acquisition was:

• foolish;
• unwise;
• unnecessary as a matter of policy; or
• different from the decision the court itself would have made.

The court is primarily concerned with whether the decision was lawfully made.

Case Example

Issue

Whether a court may invalidate an acquisition simply because it believes another development site would have been better.

Rule

Judicial review concerns the legality of administrative action rather than the merits of the policy decision itself.

Application

The State Authority selects Site A for a development project.

The landowner argues that Site B is cheaper and more suitable.

There is no evidence of bad faith, procedural illegality or improper purpose.

The argument concerns the wisdom of the administrative choice rather than its legality.

Conclusion

The court should generally not interfere merely because another decision might have been preferable.

Question 2: What is the difference between merits review and judicial review?

Answer

A merits review asks whether the administrative decision was the best or most appropriate decision.

A judicial review asks whether the decision was made lawfully.

The distinction is important because courts generally do not act as substitute land-acquisition authorities.

Their role is to ensure that the statutory discretion has been exercised within legal limits.

Case Example

Issue

Whether the court should decide which parcel of land is most appropriate for acquisition.

Rule

The court reviews legality rather than substituting its own administrative judgment.

Application

Mr. Tan argues that another parcel would have been more convenient for the Government.

If the State Authority lawfully considered the relevant matters and acted within its statutory powers, the court will not ordinarily replace that choice with Mr. Tan’s preferred option.

Conclusion

Judicial review is concerned with lawful decision-making, not with choosing the best development site.

Question 3: What is procedural ultra vires?

Answer

Procedural ultra vires occurs where an authority fails to comply with a procedural requirement imposed by law.

Because compulsory acquisition operates through statutory procedures, failure to observe mandatory requirements may expose the acquisition to judicial review.

Case Example

Issue

Whether an acquisition may be challenged where a mandatory statutory procedure has not been followed.

Rule

A statutory authority must comply with mandatory procedures governing the exercise of its powers.

Application

The State Authority acquires land but fails to perform a procedural step required by the Land Acquisition Act 1960.

The landowner does not merely disagree with the project.

He argues that the statutory acquisition machinery itself was not lawfully followed.

Conclusion

The acquisition may be vulnerable to review on the ground of procedural ultra vires.

Question 4: What is mala fide exercise of acquisition power?

Answer

Mala fide refers to the exercise of statutory power in bad faith.

A compulsory acquisition power should not be used to punish a landowner, satisfy personal hostility or achieve another dishonest objective.

Case Example

Issue

Whether land may be acquired to retaliate against a property owner.

Rule

Statutory powers must be exercised in good faith and for their lawful purposes.

Application

A politician has a personal dispute with a landowner and subsequently pressures officials to acquire the owner’s property.

Evidence shows that personal retaliation rather than genuine development is the real reason.

Conclusion

The decision may be reviewed and potentially invalidated for mala fides.

Question 5: What is an improper motive or improper purpose?

Answer

An improper motive or improper purpose arises where the statutory power is exercised to achieve an objective different from the purpose for which the legislation granted that power.

The authority may formally possess the power to acquire land, but it must use that power for its lawful statutory purpose.

Case Example

Issue

Whether land may be compulsorily acquired purely to benefit an unrelated private interest.

Rule

A statutory power must be exercised for the purpose contemplated by the legislation.

Application

The State claims that land is required for development.

Evidence shows that the real objective is merely to secure property for a private party for an unrelated purpose.

The statutory power has been diverted away from its authorised objective.

Conclusion

The acquisition may be challenged for improper purpose.

Question 6: How can unreasonableness become a ground of judicial review?

Answer

An administrative decision may be reviewed where its unreasonableness reaches the level recognised by administrative law.

This does not mean that every questionable or imperfect decision becomes unlawful.

The court does not intervene simply because it thinks the decision could have been better.

Case Example

Issue

Whether an unusually irrational acquisition decision may be reviewed.

Rule

Administrative discretion must be exercised within lawful and rational limits.

Application

The State Authority selects land completely unrelated to the stated development and provides no rational explanation connecting the property with the project.

The circumstances go beyond a mere disagreement over planning.

Conclusion

The decision may attract judicial scrutiny on the ground of administrative unreasonableness.

Question 7: What happens if the authority fails to consider relevant matters?

Answer

A public authority entrusted with discretionary power should consider matters legally relevant to the exercise of that discretion.

Failure to consider an important relevant factor may make the decision vulnerable to judicial review.

Case Example

Issue

Whether the State Authority may ignore a legally significant consideration when selecting land.

Rule

Relevant considerations must be taken into account where required by law.

Application

The legislation requires the authority to consider a particular statutory matter before acquisition.

The authority proceeds without addressing it at all.

Conclusion

The decision may be challenged for failure to consider a relevant consideration.

Question 8: What happens if irrelevant considerations influence the acquisition?

Answer

A statutory authority should not base its decision upon considerations unrelated to the purpose of the power.

Where irrelevant or extraneous factors materially influence the acquisition, the decision may be reviewed.

Case Example

Issue

Whether personal dislike of the landowner is relevant to deciding whether his land should be acquired.

Rule

Administrative discretion must be exercised on legally relevant considerations.

Application

The State Authority claims that land is required for a development project.

However, internal evidence indicates that the owner’s political views influenced the decision to select his property.

Those views have no legitimate connection with the statutory acquisition purpose.

Conclusion

The acquisition may be challenged because irrelevant considerations affected the decision.

Question 9: What is fettering of discretion?

Answer

Fettering of discretion occurs where an authority fails to exercise the discretion Parliament has actually entrusted to it.

An authority should genuinely consider the circumstances before it rather than applying a rigid policy as if it had no power to depart from it.

Case Example

Issue

Whether the State Authority may automatically acquire every parcel falling within a particular category without considering the individual circumstances.

Rule

Where legislation grants discretion, the decision-maker must genuinely exercise that discretion rather than unlawfully restricting it through an inflexible rule.

Application

The authority adopts a policy stating that every property within a particular zone must automatically be acquired regardless of the circumstances.

Officials refuse even to consider whether particular parcels are actually required.

Conclusion

The decision may be challenged on the basis that the statutory discretion has been unlawfully fettered.

Question 10: What is acting under dictation?

Answer

Acting under dictation occurs where the authority legally entrusted with the discretion does not exercise its own judgment but instead simply follows the instructions of another person or body.

The statutory decision-maker must exercise the power entrusted to it.

Case Example

Issue

Whether an authority may simply acquire land because an influential official orders it to do so.

Rule

The person or authority entrusted with statutory discretion must exercise that discretion independently.

Application

The State Authority is legally responsible for deciding whether land should be acquired.

An influential person directs officials to acquire a particular property, and the State Authority simply follows the direction without independent consideration.

Conclusion

The acquisition may be reviewed on the ground that the statutory discretion was exercised under dictation.

Question 11: Can a State Authority’s decision under section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 theoretically be challenged on these grounds?

Answer

Yes.

Section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 gives the State Authority substantial discretion concerning compulsory acquisition.

However, because that discretion is statutory, it remains subject in principle to administrative-law controls.

Therefore, a decision under section 3 may theoretically be challenged on grounds such as:

• procedural ultra vires;
• mala fides;
• improper purpose;
• improper motives;
• unreasonableness;
• failure to consider relevant matters;
• consideration of irrelevant matters;
• fettering discretion; or
• acting under dictation.

Case Example

Issue

Whether the existence of broad statutory discretion prevents judicial review.

Rule

Broad discretion remains subject to recognised principles controlling the lawful exercise of statutory powers.

Application

The State Authority relies upon section 3 but selects land solely because a third party orders it to do so.

The issue is not whether the State possesses acquisition powers generally, but whether those powers were properly exercised in this particular case.

Conclusion

A section 3 acquisition decision may theoretically be subject to judicial review where recognised legal grounds are established.

Question 12: Does section 8(3) of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 completely bar judicial review?

Answer

The better interpretation is that section 8(3) does not necessarily bar judicial review of section 4 or section 8(1) action on recognised administrative-law grounds.

Section 8(3) gives the declaration strong conclusive effect regarding the need for the scheduled land for the purpose stated.

However, that is different from saying that allegations of illegality in the exercise of statutory power can never be examined.

Case Example

Issue

Whether section 8(3) prevents a court from examining an allegation of mala fides.

Rule

Section 8(3) concerns the conclusive effect of the declaration regarding need, while judicial review examines whether statutory power was lawfully exercised.

Application

The landowner merely argues that his property was unnecessary for the development.

Section 8(3) presents a major obstacle.

However, if he alleges and proves that the acquisition was initiated solely to punish him personally, the court is examining alleged abuse of power rather than simply reconsidering administrative necessity.

Conclusion

Section 8(3) should not automatically be treated as excluding every recognised ground of judicial review.

Question 13: What was the challenge in

Yew Lean Finance Development (M) Sdn Bhd v Director of Lands & Mines, Penang

?

Answer

In Yew Lean Finance Development (M) Sdn Bhd v Director of Lands & Mines, Penang, a notification issued by the State Government under the Land Acquisition Act 1960 was challenged.

The challenge was based upon the argument that the lands were being acquired for a vague purpose.

The landowner therefore contended that the acquisition notice was null and void.

The case illustrates an attempt to subject a compulsory acquisition notification to judicial scrutiny by relying upon administrative-law principles concerning the lawful exercise of discretion.

Case Example

Issue

Whether an acquisition notification may be challenged because its stated purpose is allegedly too vague.

Rule

Discretionary statutory powers should be exercised for sufficiently identifiable and lawful purposes.

Application

A notification uses broad terminology that the landowner argues fails to reveal the real purpose of acquisition.

The landowner asks the court to determine whether the wording is legally sufficient.

Conclusion

The allegation of vagueness may form a ground upon which the legality of the acquisition notification is challenged.

3. Case Study Revisited

Maju Finance Development’s Challenge to the Acquisition

Maju Finance Development Sdn Bhd owns land that the State Authority proposes to acquire under section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act 1960.

A preliminary notice is issued under section 4.

The company believes that the stated purpose is vague and questions the legality of the acquisition.

However, it understands that it cannot succeed merely by saying:

• the State made a foolish decision;
• another site would have been better;
• it disagrees with the development policy; or
• the court should choose a different acquisition strategy.

Instead, the company must identify a recognised ground of judicial review.

Potential grounds include:

• procedural ultra vires;
• mala fides;
• improper motive;
• improper purpose;
• unreasonableness;
• failure to consider relevant considerations;
• consideration of irrelevant matters;
• fettering of discretion; and
• acting under dictation.

The State Authority argues that the acquisition falls within its discretion under section 3 and that section 8(3) of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 gives strong finality to the subsequent declaration.

Maju Finance Development responds that section 8(3) should not be interpreted as preventing judicial review of unlawful administrative action connected with a section 4 or section 8(1) notification.

The dispute therefore concerns the relationship between:

• administrative discretion;
• judicial review;
• section 3;
• section 4;
• section 8(1);
• section 8(3);
• vagueness;
• legality;
• administrative merits; and
• judicial control of compulsory acquisition powers.

4. Solution to the Case Study

Issue

The first issue is whether the State Authority’s discretionary decision to acquire land under section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 is capable of judicial review.

The second issue is whether the court may examine allegations such as vagueness, mala fides, improper purpose or irrelevant considerations without improperly reviewing the merits of the acquisition.

The third issue is whether section 8(3) of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 prevents judicial review of a section 4 or section 8(1) notification on such grounds.

Rule

Courts generally do not review discretionary administrative decisions merely because they disagree with the merits of the decision.

Judicial review does not ask whether an acquisition was wise, foolish or preferable as a matter of policy.

Instead, courts have developed recognised grounds for reviewing the legality of discretionary decisions.

These include:

• procedural ultra vires;
• mala fides;
• improper motives;
• improper purpose;
• unreasonableness;
• failure to consider relevant considerations;
• consideration of irrelevant considerations;
• fettering discretion; and
• acting under dictation.

Accordingly, a State Authority exercising powers under section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 remains theoretically subject to these administrative-law controls.

Section 8(3) gives the section 8 declaration strong conclusive effect concerning the need for the scheduled land for the stated purpose.

However, that provision does not necessarily prevent a challenge directed at the lawfulness of the exercise of statutory power itself.

Application

Maju Finance Development cannot succeed merely because it disagrees with the State Authority’s decision.

If its argument is simply that acquiring the land was unwise or that another property should have been selected, the court should ordinarily refuse to intervene.

Those arguments concern the merits of the administrative decision.

The position is different if the company can establish a recognised legal defect.

For example, if the acquisition purpose is genuinely so vague that the statutory discretion cannot be linked to an authorised purpose, a question of legality may arise.

Similarly, judicial review may become available if evidence demonstrates:

• bad faith;
• private or improper motives;
• reliance upon legally irrelevant factors;
• failure to consider matters required by law;
• unlawful restriction of discretion; or
• decision-making under the command of another person.

The role of the court in such circumstances is not to decide whether it would have acquired the land.

Its role is to determine whether the State Authority exercised the power Parliament gave it in a legally permissible manner.

Section 8(3) should also be analysed carefully.

The provision gives substantial finality concerning the need for land after the relevant declaration.

Therefore, the company cannot simply use judicial review to reopen the question of whether the land was really necessary.

However, allegations that the decision-making process was itself unlawful are analytically different.

For example, a challenge alleging mala fides does not merely contend that the State Authority made the wrong choice.

It argues that the State Authority abused the statutory power.

Therefore, in theory, section 8(3) need not completely prevent judicial review of section 4 or section 8(1) action on recognised administrative-law grounds.

Nevertheless, the practical difficulty for Maju Finance Development remains significant.

The material indicates that relatively few such notifications have been successfully challenged and that outcomes have generally not favoured challengers.

The company therefore requires strong evidence rather than a bare allegation of illegality.

Conclusion

The State Authority’s discretionary power under section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 is not theoretically immune from judicial review.

A landowner may challenge the exercise of that power on recognised administrative-law grounds such as procedural ultra vires, mala fides, improper purpose, unreasonableness, irrelevant considerations, failure to consider relevant matters, fettering of discretion or acting under dictation.

However, the court will not review the decision merely because it disagrees with the merits of the acquisition.

Furthermore, section 8(3) gives substantial finality to the declaration concerning the need for the land.

Accordingly, a successful challenger must distinguish between simply disputing the State’s acquisition judgment and demonstrating an actual legal defect in the exercise of statutory discretion.

5. Critical Analysis

The distinction between merits review and judicial review is central to understanding the courts’ role in compulsory land acquisition.

The State Authority possesses significant responsibility for determining when and where land is required for development.

Those decisions may involve:

• urban planning;
• infrastructure;
• housing;
• economic development;
• transportation;
• public facilities; and
• long-term governmental policy.

Courts are generally not institutionally designed to make those decisions.

It is therefore appropriate that judges do not interfere merely because they believe an administrative choice was unwise.

If every acquisition could be challenged simply by persuading a judge that another site would have been better, compulsory acquisition would effectively become subject to judicial planning approval.

That would blur the constitutional and administrative distinction between the executive and the judiciary.

However, judicial restraint cannot mean judicial abandonment.

A broad statutory discretion is still a legal discretion.

It does not authorise decision-makers to act for any reason whatsoever.

The grounds of judicial review developed by the courts perform an important controlling function.

Procedural Ultra Vires

Procedural requirements ensure that public powers are exercised through the mechanism prescribed by law.

If mandatory procedures can simply be ignored, statutory safeguards lose their practical significance.

Mala Fides

Bad-faith acquisition represents a direct abuse of public power.

Compulsory acquisition should never become an instrument of personal revenge or political retaliation.

Improper Purpose and Motive

A statutory power must remain connected to the objective for which Parliament created it.

An authority cannot use compulsory acquisition machinery merely because doing so is convenient for an unrelated objective.

Relevant and Irrelevant Considerations

Administrative discretion must be exercised rationally within the legal framework.

Ignoring matters that the law requires to be considered, or relying upon matters that have no lawful relevance, may distort the decision-making process.

Fettering of Discretion

Where Parliament grants discretion, the authority should actually exercise it.

An inflexible policy that prevents genuine consideration of individual circumstances may defeat the purpose of granting discretionary power in the first place.

Acting Under Dictation

The statutory decision-maker must remain the true decision-maker.

If an authority simply obeys another person without independently exercising the discretion entrusted to it, the statutory scheme may be undermined.

The difficult question concerns the effect of section 8(3) of the Land Acquisition Act 1960.

On one hand, the provision promotes administrative certainty by giving conclusive effect to the declaration that the land is required for the stated purpose.

This finality is important.

Major development projects could become practically unmanageable if every question concerning the necessity of particular land remained indefinitely open to litigation.

On the other hand, interpreting section 8(3) as completely eliminating judicial review would create serious rule-of-law concerns.

A statutory declaration should not necessarily become a legal shield behind which mala fides, improper motives or procedural illegality are protected.

The more defensible distinction is therefore between:

conclusiveness regarding the declared need, and

judicial review of the legality of the exercise of statutory power.

This distinction allows section 8(3) to retain meaningful effect while preserving the courts’ supervisory role.

The practical record described in the material is also important.

Although the theoretical grounds of challenge are broad, successful challenges have apparently been relatively rare.

This reveals the difference between theoretical reviewability and practical success.

A landowner may possess the legal right to challenge an acquisition, but establishing one of these grounds requires evidence.

A court will not infer mala fides merely because the owner strongly opposes the acquisition.

Similarly, a broad purpose is not automatically vague.

The challenger must demonstrate a legally recognised defect.

The example of Yew Lean Finance Development (M) Sdn Bhd v Director of Lands & Mines, Penang illustrates this practical difficulty.

The landowner attempted to challenge the notification by arguing that the acquisition purpose was vague and the notice therefore void.

The case demonstrates that the courts are capable of hearing such challenges, but the existence of a ground of review does not automatically mean that the challenger will succeed.

For Malaysian Property Law, the broader lesson is that the State Authority’s discretion is broad but legally structured.

Judicial review should not become a vehicle for courts to determine the wisdom of development policy.

At the same time, administrative discretion should not become equivalent to unlimited governmental power.

An effective legal system must therefore maintain both administrative autonomy and judicial accountability.

6. Recommendations

1. Maintain the distinction between merits and legality

Courts should continue distinguishing between disagreement with the wisdom of an acquisition and a genuine allegation of unlawful exercise of power.

2. Preserve recognised grounds of judicial review

Compulsory acquisition decisions should remain theoretically reviewable for procedural ultra vires, mala fides, improper purpose, unreasonableness and other established administrative-law defects.

3. Give proper effect to section 8(3)

Section 8(3) of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 should continue providing substantial finality concerning the declared need for land.

4. Avoid treating section 8(3) as complete immunity

The conclusive effect of the declaration should not automatically protect unlawful exercises of statutory power from all forms of judicial scrutiny.

5. Require credible evidence from challengers

Allegations of mala fides, improper motive or irrelevant considerations should be supported by persuasive evidence.

6. Require authorities to document relevant considerations

Clear administrative records can demonstrate that the State Authority genuinely considered matters relevant to the acquisition.

7. Prevent fettering of statutory discretion

Authorities should avoid rigid policies that eliminate genuine consideration of individual circumstances where Parliament has granted discretion.

8. Protect independent decision-making

The legally authorised State Authority should make acquisition decisions independently rather than merely following directions from unrelated persons or bodies.

9. State acquisition purposes clearly

Clear acquisition purposes reduce disputes concerning vagueness and strengthen transparency.

10. Preserve judicial oversight without judicial substitution

Courts should remain willing to intervene where statutory power is abused while avoiding substitution of judicial preferences for lawful administrative planning decisions.

7. Conclusion

Over time, administrative law has developed a series of principles governing the lawful exercise of discretionary governmental power.

These principles are directly relevant to compulsory acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act 1960.

The courts do not ordinarily interfere with a discretionary acquisition decision merely because they believe that it was unwise, foolish or undesirable.

Nor will the court substitute its own view simply because it would have made a different decision.

Judicial review is concerned principally with legality rather than merits.

Accordingly, a decision of the State Authority under section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 may theoretically be challenged on recognised grounds including:

• procedural ultra vires;
• mala fides;
• improper motives;
• improper purpose;
• unreasonableness;
• failure to consider relevant matters;
• consideration of irrelevant matters;
• fettering of discretion; and
• acting under dictation.

Section 8(3) of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 gives strong conclusive effect to the declaration that the scheduled land is required for the stated purpose.

However, this should not necessarily be understood as preventing every form of judicial review relating to section 4 or section 8(1).

A distinction must be maintained between reopening the State Authority’s assessment that the land is needed and challenging an allegedly unlawful exercise of statutory power.

The example of Yew Lean Finance Development (M) Sdn Bhd v Director of Lands & Mines, Penang demonstrates how a landowner may attempt to challenge an acquisition notification on the ground that the stated purpose is vague and therefore legally defective.

Nevertheless, the practical success of such challenges has historically been limited.

This reflects the significant evidential and legal burden faced by landowners seeking to establish abuse of administrative discretion.

For Malaysian Property Law, the central principle is therefore that the State Authority possesses wide but not unlimited discretion.

Courts should respect lawful administrative choices while remaining prepared to intervene where recognised grounds demonstrate that the statutory acquisition power has been exercised unlawfully.

Ultimately, the proper balance lies in preserving administrative discretion, statutory finality, judicial supervision and the rule of law.